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This thesis is an attempt to put together the history of Al-Hijaz, 
and to present a description of the political situation during the 
period from the year 1520 through the year 1632. The period starts 
three years after the submission of Sharif Barakat II of Mecca to the 
new Islamic power, the Ottomans. And it concludes with the restor­
ation of onter in Mecca in 1632. 
In deciding to select this topic, I was inspired by the lack of 
a complete history of the Holy Lands during the period t the importance 
of the period, and the fact that most authors who dealt with the area, 
during or after the period, took sides either with the Ottomans or the 
Ashrafs of Mecca. 
In looking for sources, I was unfortunate because I could not 
find any Ottoman Farman of the period, but I think the other sources, 
primary and secondary, helped me a lot, and without hesitation I could 
recommend some of them to any interested student of the area or the 
period: 
A) Primary sources: 1) Mana;zih AI-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa 
Wullat Al-Haram by Taj AI-Din AI-Khatib; 2) Smitt Al-Nojoum Al-rAwali 
Fi Anba' AI-Awa'il Wa Al-Tawali by Alxiulmalik Al-Makki, and 3) Tariltll 
Makkah by Ahmad Al-Siba I i. Although this is not a primary source, the 
valuable infonnation contained in it qualifies it to be on the same 
level as the above two. 
B) Secondary sources: 1) The ottoman Turks and the Arabs by 
George Stripling; 2) Bulers o:L~.l3SS.A by Gerald De Gaury, and 3) 'rh~ 
Port~guese of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant. 
The conclusions of this thesis could be summarized by the follow­
ing: 
A) The continuous attempts by the Ashrafs of Mecca to establish 
a kingdom Oy sending expeditions into areas that the Ottomans were less 
interested in. 
E) The unwise Ottoman and local administrations of the area which 
did not help to develop or improve conditions of Al-Hijaz. 
C) The constant use of the word Islam by many figures in order to 
achieve their goals. 
D) The important role that the Ottomans played in clearing the 
Red Sea. 
E) The weak Ottoman policy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian 
Ocean, which left the S. Arabian coast an easy target for European 
nations later. 
F) Finally, the role of the Ashrafs in causing disturbances by 
the constant fighting among themselves which led to casualties and 
foreign intervention. 
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,CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an attempt to put together the history' of Al-Hijaz 
frarl the year 1520 to 1632, in a chronological order. . The paper covers 
Al-Hijaz since the Sharif of Mecca, Barakat II, declared his loyalty to 
the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt in 1517. up to the year 1632" 
when Sh~rif Zaid took over the Sharifate in Mecca. 
The ,writer of this thesis became lnterested In attEmpting to write 
a history of Al-Hijaz because of the following factors: 
A) The books that were written about Al-Hijaz fell into the fol­
lowing categories: 1) books that dealt only with geography; 2) books 
that described religious sites and rites or ceremonies: 3) books that 
dealt with the political situation; 4) very few books that tried to 
give a complete picture by treating all aspects of life, and 5) non­
Arabic books which dealt with Ai-Hijaz in their attempts to discuss 
the 'Ottoman Einpire, but did not go into enough detail because at the 
time of their writing, the interest was directed" toward tbe Ottoman West, 
rather than the Ottoman East. 
B) The Arab lands' were passing through their dark ages. This was 
due to the following factors: 1) the non-Arab rulers" whose main 
interest was to keep their thrones as long as possible, without paying 
attention to theil" subjects r conditions; 2)· the Europeans attEmpts t 
represented first by the Portuguese, to stop the advanceS of the Islamic 
forces, and to strangle thEm, by every available means, and 3) the new 
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masters, the Ottomans, also forgot about their Arab subjects and paid 
more attention to their European and Persian frontiers, and thus con­
tributed heavily to the setback of the Arabic~d Islaroic civili7,a­
tions~ 
In my attempts to find good primary sources, I was fortunate to 
find a few handwritten sources that were ~itherwritten during the 
period, or some years after'it. However, I could not find certain 
other prlmary sources that were mentioned in some of the books. I was 
unable to find in Saudi Arabia any ottoman Farman (decrees) that dealt 
with AI-Hijaz during the period. In most of the sources, primary o'r 
secondary, the authors used Farman of later periods as models for the 
earlier ones. 
In discussing the sources, there are sone sources that are worth 
mentioning and describing, such as: 1) !arikll.11_a~K~h. by Ahmad Al-Siba Ii. 
Although it is not a primary source, it is one of the leading printed 
books t,hat treated the subject completely by giving the reader a clear, 
but not detailed political, historical, economical, social and religious 
picture. The book was supported by a valuable list of prlmary sources. 
2) 1i~lla.~A .A~-Kar~Ji ..A~h~<!!!Jl~<.k§!:.h·Ha-1TullC?-..:LAl'-Hat§1!!l by Taj 
AI-Din AI-Khatib. It is one of the leading primary sources which deals 
with Mecca since the early time, and ends in the year 1125 H, the year 
in which the author died. The book, which is unprinted, goes into de­
tail discussing the sixteenth and seventeenth century political picture 
in Mecca. 
:3) ~it ~ _Al-~.9..1ounL.A1- ~Aw~!.i fiAnba I Al ~!l!.a f il Wa A1-t~~.§:.~i by 
Abdulmalik Al-Makki. It is one of the leading prmted primary sources 
that deals with the hiBtor.y of Mecca, and goes into more detail than the 
J 

book by Taj Al-Din AI-Khatib. 
4) 'J,'he Ottoman Turks and the Arabs by George' Stripling. It is one 
of the leading non-:Arabic books that deals with the Ottomans and Arab 
lands, including Al-Hijaz. The book deals also with commerce and the 
struggle in the Red Sea, and uses some of the' primary sources that are 
mentioned in the bibliography of this thesis • 
. 5) The Portuguese of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant. It 
deals with the Portuguese activities in the East, as well as in the Red 
Sea. And it gives a good description of the Portuguese attack on Jeddah, 
which he quoted from the Chronology of Al-Haddrami. 
6) Rulers of Mecca by Gerald De Gaury. The author presents to the 
reader'the history of Mecca fran its foundation' up to the year 1881. It 
also includes pictures of some of the local customs and rites. The 
author's bibliography included some Arabic primary sources which he 
used by having a certain Arab employee at the British Embassy in Baghdad 
translate them into English. The author showed an unfavorable attitude 
toward the Turks, but this attitude could be the result of the fact that 
the author fougbt the Turks during 'W'orld War I, as a British officer. 
In reading this paper, the reader will. find it mostly dealing with 
. 
the history of Mecca and Medina, because the history of Al-Hijaz is so 
much tied to the history of the two holiest cities of Islam. As is men­
tioned before, the thesis is 'an attempt to put together the internal 
histor,y of Al-Hijaz, and it will also treat the Portuguese threat in 
the Red Sea during the early part of the period. The paper will include 
some maps and illustrations that are needed to clarit,y the subject. 
GHAPTER II 
AL-HIJAZ' 
I. GEOGRAPHY 
Al-Hijaz oooupies most of' the western part of the present Kingdom . 
of Saudi Arabia. It runs along the' eastern ooast· of the Red Sea. Al­
Hijaz oonsistf? of. two zones, a ooastal plain, and a mountain area whioh 
are separated by the steep westem slopes of the mountains. 
The Arab geographers differed on where the name ttAl-Hijaz" oame 
from, but the most reasonable ..theory is the one that states that the 
name oomes from the Arabio word IIHajiz tf , whioh means barrier. Judging 
from itsgeographioalpoistion, Al-Hijaz is aotually a barrier between 
Syria and Yanen, and between the Red Sea and the Highlands of Nejd. 
Al-~Hijaz is the spiritual oenter for all Muslims in the world be­
oause it wa.s the home of Prophet Mohamad. It is where he was born, 
where he received the revelation from God, and where he was buried. It 
also contains the two holiest cities of Islam, Meooa and Medina.
. -
II. PEOPLE 
Most of its population are of theSunni division. I was unable to 
find any infonnation oonoerning the number of the population of Al-Hijaz 
during the period we are oonoerned with. Although it may be possible 
to get the needed information fran the tax records, unfortunately it was 
inipossible tor me because they are located in Istanbul, Turkey. 
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The population was divided into two groups, the city people and the 
tribesmen. The city people were settled in established towns and took 
up such professions as merchants, carpenters, and other small profes­
sions. The tribesmen were the majority, and more influentual. All 
through the history of the Arabs, we see the tribes associateci with the 
political pattern of each Arab country. However, they had their own 
political pattern wh ich continued up to the present time. They were al­
ways. sources of trouble, and paid loyalty only to their Sbaykhs. They 
would revolt if their interests clashed with that of the ruler, or if 
the ruler stopped or delayed their traditional payments, which were used 
to keep them quiet am under control. Their revolts caused casualties 
in lives and properties to the city population, and most important to 
the pilgrims. More than half of the tribes of AI-Hijaz are related to 
the big and important tribe of Harb or its allies. 
III.n1:PORrANT TGJNS 
Me~a_. (Mak~al?-)is located on the steep western slopes of the moun­
tainsin a narrow and deep valley. The hills and mountains around it 
provided Mecca with natural protection. This city was the birthplace 
of Prophet Mohamad, and it contains the Great Mosque and the sacred Al­
Ka 1ba. A Turkish fortress is located on the Mountain of Qubais. During 
the .period of this paper, Mecca was the center of power in AI-Hijaz, be­
cau'se'the Sharif. resided in it. 
Me~in~a~in~g) is the second holiest city in Islam because it 
contains the grave of the Prophet and his mOSiue. Medina served as the 
capital of the Prophet and his first three CUSSCSSOr5. In 1539, the 
ottoman Sultan Suliman (the Magnificent) ordered the building of its 
---
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wall to protect it from triba,l attacks • 
. J_edc!~~ was established by the Caliph 'Uthman1 m 647 AD, and soon 
became the port of. Mecca. Withm Jeddah, there is a grave believed to 
be the grave of Eve t the· mother of all human bemgs. 
I.~i£: is· one of the oldest towns in the Arabian Peninsula. It was 
the headquarters for the armies of Al-Hijaz governments. The Ottomans 
built its lvall in 1 799, and used to jail some of· their political prison­
ers, such as the famous Medhat Pasha, m its fortress. 
Yunbu' is the natural port of Medma, and it was from it that in 

1200, Sharif Qitadah Bm Idris led an ar,my to occupy Mecca, and to 

. establish the second Emirate of A1-Ashraf. In 1666, a group of its 
Ashrafs left for Morocco to establish the present ruling dynasty. Ihr':' 
ing the period we are concerned with, rebellious Ashrafs would leave 
Mecca to take refuge m 'YUnbu'. 
1.Abdul-Qudus Al-Ansari, Ta;:ikh tl,edc!!b. (Jeddah, saudi Arabia: 
1382 H), p. 7. 
ClIAPTER III 
HISTORrCAL BACKGROUND 
I. THE PERIOD FRCM 610-1200 AD 
Before 610, ,the Arabian Peninsula never enjoyed having a strong 
united government. But by the year 632, when Prophet Mohamad died, the 
Arabian Peninsula was united under the control of the Prophet. His 
death was followed by a civil war, ignited by tribal ambitions, but the 
first O~hodox Caliph, Abu-Bakr, succeeded in restoring law and order. 
Under the first three orthodox Caliphs, Abu-Bakr, 'Omar and 
'Uthman,who kept Medina as a capital, the Muslims conquered a vast 
area, which brought great wealth back to Al-Hijaz. But those conquests 
caused Al-Hijaz to lose its, best men. The disturbances toward the end 
of f!uthman I s' period led to his murder, and the new Caliph, 'Ali, felt 
that Kufa in Iraq would be a safer capital for his struggle against the 
, Umayads in Syria. A few years later, 'Ali was killed and the Umayad 
M:u 'awiyah was proclaimed as the new Caliph in Daplascus :in 660. AD. By 
changing the capital from Medina to Kufa, and later to Damascus, Al-Hijaz 
lost its political power and kept its religious influence only. 
This was a period of no significant political and commercial im­
portance, and or increased isolation and disorder in Al-Hijaz. Mecca 
enjoyed sanctity, but had to depend on the annual pilgrimage for its 
prosperity, and on Egypt for its food supplies. Medina was less sacred, 
but was involved in a rivalry with Mecca, because it was nearer to the 
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'capitals, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo. This made it a more suitable 
residence for the caliph 1 s governor than Mecca. 
Mecca became ,the center'for learning, and the retreat of discon­
tented ,men who did not like'the Umayads secular government. In 692, the 
Umayad General Al-Hajaj besieged Mecca, and bombarded Al-Ka 'ba, using 
catapults. The coming of I Abbasids brought more prestige to Mecca and 
Medina because of the religious policy of the new dynasty. ' The 'Abbasids 
sent more"money and separate governors to Mecca and Medina; however, re­
volts contmued. 
'Ali I S descendants, who were numerous, and who had great influence 
in Mecca, 11edina and Yunbu', "VTere opposed to 'any authority, but theirs, 
but they could not aeree among thems e.lves. They were favored by the 
", 
beduins because they were the' descendants of Husayn and Hasarl, the grand- ' 
sons of PropherMohamad.As the caliphate declined, their power in­
creased. Their policy vTas to playoff the Caliphates against each 
other, and to have good relations with the rulers of Yemen. The Hasanids 
who were descendants of 'Al~ls son Al~Hasan, took control of Mecca, 
while the Husaynids, the descendants of 'Ali I S second son, Al-Husayn, 
were in control of Medina. 
In 930, the Shi'i Qaramittah sacked Mecca and carried a'\vay the 
sacred Black stone, Which they returned in 950. In 950, the Hasanid 
Sharif Ja r far Al-r-Iousawi attacked Mecca, established the first Sharifid 
Ei'nirite and kept good relations with the Fatimids. In 1011, Ja' far IS 
sari Abu AlFutuh2 had a quarrel with the fanatic Fatimid Caliph Al-Ha~{im, 
so' he declared himself a Caliph, but later he and his successors de­
, 2Ahrnad Al-Siba'i, 1;~~!.~ll.M~~kall (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 1372 H), 
n. 209. 
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clared their loyalty to the I Abbasid Caliuhate. 
Since 1061, a ~.::trur:ele bctil'Teen the Housa't·rids and. thE) HU3c.:mid s I 
Al-Fatikis led to the seizure of Al-Ka"ba r5 treasures by the Shtlibis, 
.the hereditarY keepers of Al~Ka'bars keys. This led to the interven­
tion of theYe.mcn ruler, 'Ali Al-Sulaihi), who,appointed Abu-Hashim 
Nuhamad as the new Sharif. After Abu Hashim r s death, the Ashrafs 
struggled among themselves, which led to disorder, plundering thn pil­
grims; imposinE heavy taxes on pile;rims whose rulers could not protect 
them, and the looting of Mecca by the tribe of Hudhail. 
In 1174, the Ayoubid Turan visited Mecca and aopointed a Hasanid 
to the Sharif~te of Mecca, and replaced the Zaidi Shi1i rite with the 
Sunni .Shafi Ii. 
1>. 
To . sUIlUllarize, this .was a period in which AI-Hijaz enjoyed ~jtabil-
ity during the first forty years, but suffered from contiriuous revolts, 
either by the Ashrafs or the tribes, during the rest of the period. It 
was a period that saw interventions by outsiders, either to calm thines 
doWn, or to impose their Ovffi men as the Sharifs. However, the different 
Caliphates continued sending money and supplie~ to the people of Mecca 
and Medina. By having the Sharifs declare their loyalty to them and 
. 
mention their names as protectors of Islam in AI-Khuttba, a relieious 
speech preceeding the Friday prayer, and at the end of it, the speaker 
thanks the ruler and calls upon God to help him. 
II. THE PERIOD FROM 1200-1520 
In the year 1200, the Ashrafs of Yl.U1bu I, led by Qitada, "mo lias 
Jrbid ., n. 211. 
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'disoleased with the uolicy of his relatives in Mecca, attacked Mecca and 
est.c1.blished the second Sharifid Enir.ite. At the beginning he had eood 
relations with both the I Abbasid:s and Ayoubids, but later he caused 
trouble 't-Tiththe rAbbasids. In the year 1212,Qitada did not receive 
the Ayoubid Caliph Al-'Adil well, which made Al~'Adil angry ~t Qitada. 
In Al-Hijaz itself, Qitada extended his rule over the whole area 
except for Medina whose Husaynids ruler refused to submit, and foueht 
Qitada several times. The-_historians4 differed on "Whether Qitada vTon 
Medina, but it seems that he did not since the Husaynids continued to 
i'rule J.Tedina for several years after Qitada 1 s death, which came at the 
hands of his son Hasan in the year 1220. 
Hasan faced trouble from his brother Ragih, who conspired with the 
•Abbasids, but Hasan defeated the 'Abbasids and his brother who fled to 
the Ayoubid ruler of Yemen, Mas'oud. In 1221, Mas'oud attacked Mecca, 
sacked it and appointed one of his generals as the governor. Hasan fled 
to the desert and tried to recover Mecca the following year., But he 
failed and fled to Baghdad, where he died. 
From 1222 until 1249, Mecca was the victim of continued war be­
t'VJeen the Ayoubids of Yemen, and the Ayoubidsof Egypt. During that, 
period, the rule in l-tecca clFnged eight times, and with the change of 
rule, the governors changed, and the population, suff,ered the most. In 
1225, the HusaynidQasim of Medina tried to recover Mecca, but he could 
no't.' 
In 1250, the Mamluks deposed the Ayoubids in Egypt. In 1258, 

Mogols led by Hulagu, took Baghdad and destroyed the f Abbasids there. 

4rb~~.~ p. 213. 
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The ~tamluks invited the remaining • Abbas ids to Cairo to gain more reli­
gious influence. In Mecca, Qitada' s des,cendants kept fighting amone 
themselves, while the Husaynids controlled Medina. 
In 12,54, the Sharif of Mecca was .Ghanlm, the grandson of Qitada. 
But his rule did not last long because his COUSln Idris and Sharif Abu 
Noumi I, attacked Mecca and ruled it together•. ' In 1257, Abu Noumi,I 
became the sole ruler, after he had a quarrel with .his uncle, Idcis, 
'Who fled the city and kept bothering h:im until he was killed. 
In 1260, t~e Mamluk Sultan Baibars made the pilgrlmage to Mecca, 
and decided· to leave theintemalaffairs of Al-Hijaz in' the hands of 
Abu Noumi I, because of his finnness. However, his long period (12.54­
1301 ') was marked with wars with the rulers of Medlna, who in 1284 forced 
him to leave Mecca. Iht he .succeeded in regaining control of the city 
after a short period. He also imposed high taxes on the pilgrims; it 
is reported that he asked for thirty dirhams from each pilgrim. His 
wars with the rulers of 1'1edina caused his relation with the .Mamluks ,to 
become. bad, so in 1291, he declared loyalty to the Yemeni ruler, and 
started mentioning his harne in Al-Khuttba until he died in 1301 • 
Following his death, his sons fought among themselves until his 
grandson rAjlan finally took control of the Shar1fate In 1346, . and ruled 
until 1375. However, his period was marked by political unrests , which 
bothered the Mamluk Sultan, Who swore to extenninate all of the Ashrafs. 5 
He introduced the system of appointing his son and the future successor 
as a co-regent, \..h'Op1ng that this move could help to avoid family strug­
gle before or after his death • 
.5.tbid. f p. 215. 
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His successor, Hasan, tried successfully to extend his rule over 
all of Al-Hijaz, but had to try to avoid causing the interference of 
his Mamluk master in Egypt. In 1425, the Mamluks took charge of the 
customs in Jeddah, and ma:intained a small garrison at Mecca. The ap­
pointments of his successors bad to be confirmed by the Mamluk SUltans. 
The period of Mohamad Bin Barakat I (1455-1496) 'was a period of stabil­
ity because of his strong personality, and his ability to deal firmly 
with the tribes. 
In its tum, the stability caused prosperity in AI-Hijaz. Arter' 
, his death, the Mamluk Sultan Kaitby appointed his son, Barakat n, as 
the new Sharif. But soon Ba'rakat II faced opposition from his brothers 
Haza I and Ahamad AI-Jazani,t who succeeded in forcing Barakat to leave 
Mecca. Barakat II stayed in, jeddah, and returned to Mecca with Amir 
AI-Haj Al-Masri (the prince, or the leader of the Egyptian pilgrims). 
He exiled his brother Haza to Yuribu', but the latter gathered an army,
' 
defeated Barakat who had' to flee to AI-Laith. 
When Haza I died, Barakat returned to Mecca in time to receive 
from the Mamluk SUltan the Khul'ah (a cloak given ,by the SUltan to con­
firm the Sharif's appointment). Barakat had to accompany the Egyptian 
'pilgrims to Yunbu I because ,his brother Al-Jazani, looted the Syrian pil­
grlms~ The war continued between the two brothers, and Mecca changed 
hands between them. 
In 1502, an Egyptian force arrived and forced Al-Jazani to leave 
Mecca to his brother Barakat. However, Barakat hesitated to receive 
the 'Egyptian commander, who, arrested Barakat. The commander took a 
bribe from Al-Jazani in order to support his rule in Mecca, and Barakat 
was taken to Egypt in chains. 
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Upon his arrival irl Egypt, he was welcomed and supported by the 
•Ulama there, until 1503 when he hear¢! the news of Al-Jazani' s assassi­
nation. He set out for Mecca, and the new Sharif, his brother Humaiddah, 
.fled the city when he heard of Barakat's advance. Barakat proclaimed 
himself the ruler of Al-Hijaz, and appointed his brother Kaitby and son 
t Ali as the co-governors of Mecca • 
. At that time, the Muslims faced a new danger, represented by the 
Portuguese, who wf!l:re threatenipg the Muslims t control of the Red Sea. 
The threat and the struggle that followed will be dealt with in a 
separate chapter later. 
The threat to Jeddah forced the Mamluk SUltan Al-Ghouri to order 

the building of a fleet in Suez in 1506. The ottoman SUltan. Bayazid 

sent wood and men to help in building the.f1eet. Later the fleet was 

. sent into the Red :3ea to counter the Portuguese threat. The Commander 
Husayn Al-Kurdi arrived in Jeddah, and decided to build a wall to pro­
tect it. He ordered every able man to work, and ordered the demolish­
ing of many houses to use their materials in building the wall. The 
wall was tinishedin less than a year, but the Portuguese. main attack 
did not come until 1541. 
In 1517, the Ottomans, who became the strongest Islamic power 
at that time, were led by Sultan Salim I. He defeated the Mamluks, 
conquered Syria and Egypt, and declared AI-Hijaz as part of the Ottoman 
Empire. Sharif Barakat II did not hesitate to send his son Abu Noumi II 
to Egypt, to declare his loyalty to the new master. Sultan Salim I 
rece~ved hm well and confimed his' position in Al-Hijaz, with the 
Sharif I s acknowled grnent of the Ottoman supremacy. 
S1arif· Barakat ordered the mentioning of the name of the Ottoman 
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Sultan.1n Al-Khuthah. and tricked the Mamluk Commander Husayn AI-Kurdi 
into coming. to Mecca. He executed him, but some of the Mamluks fled to 
Yemen, where they caused sane trouble for the ottomans. Sultan Salim I 
sent Husayn AI-Rumi CAl-Rais) as his representative in Jeddah •. 
II. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE OTT(}1AN AIMINISTRATION 
SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
According to the regulations of the Muslim state, the Ottoman 
Sultan was the absolute ruler, and was l1lnited only by religious tenets. 
To administer his buge empire, the Sultan was assisted by the men in 
his Diwan (cabinet), who bore the title of Pasha, and who were headed 
by a Grand. Vizir (Prime Minister). The treasury ot the empire was left 
in charge of the two Derteroars (treasurers) ,of Rume1ia and Anato1ia, 
". 
aided in the Arab lands by one of the lower rank residing at Aleppo. 
The j~dicia1 system was headed by the two Kazieskersot Rume1ia and 
Anato1ia, who received appeals and appointed all judges. The local 
judges ot cities and towns were cal1edKadis,while the judges of vil­
1ages were called Na l ibs, and the local· authority controlled their 
appointments. The law was enforced by Muhtasibs, who were given soldiers 
to do so•. 
The administration of the state was organized in a military 
fashion, and rested on a system that resembled European feudalism, with 
the. exc~ption that "in the Turkish plan homage was not pIedged"6 • The 
sons of the vassals were not pennitted to' inherit their fathers I hold­
ings, except under certain conditions. The administrators rose through 
. the military ranks to hold administrative pOSitions. 
6George Stripling, '!l!.e Ottoman Turks 8}!.d the ~Ara~ (Illinois, USA: 
1942), p~60. 
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I. THE GENERAL OTT~AN AOONISTRATICW OF PROVINCES 
Upon conquering a province, the Ottoman amy would move in, and 
with it came land registrars who would count the towns and villages in 
that province. They divided them into fiefs in the. following way: 
1) small fiefs for the fighting soldeirsi 2} a number of large fiefs 
for the princes and generals, and 3) a number of large fiefs for the 
Sultan. However, the system of fiefs was not used in Egypt and Al-Hijaz. 
"This system did not mean that the vassal would be the owner of 
all lands and villages in his fief"?, but he had the right to collect 
taxes from the owners in his fief. He also had to be ready to answer 
the SUltan's call for military campaigns by preparing an army whos e 
". 
number of soldiers was detennined the following was: one soldier for 
each 5,000 Akce. So if the f~ef production was 10,000 Akce, it would 
have to prepare two soldiers. 
The fiefs we re divided into the folloi·rin::;: 1) TiJ-nar: small 
fief whose production was less than 20,000 Akce. --i,--za' amat: 
larger than the TiInar and its production was between 20 t 660: 
100,000 Akce. 3)~: A larger fief whose production was 
more than 100,000 Akce. 8 
The provinces were divided politically and militarily into "Iyalat" 
. 
with each IIIyalah"· divided into tlAlwiyatlt or nSanjaksU and each "Liwa" 
had a number o'ir Timars and Za' amats. Each Itlyalah" was ruled by a' 
Pasha called "Bikr Biki II, which means the Bek of Al-Bakawat. And his 
military rank was I~ir Miran" ,wilic means Amir ul-Umara. Each "Liwa" 
. 7 Satti ' Al-Husari, ~.:!!i..l.~d Al-'Arabi~ ~':a Al-Dowleh AI:. 

IUtht!J~n~'tl ( Beirut, Lebanon: 1965) ,p. 29. . 

8 . Ib~,.9.., p. 30. 
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was ruled by a Bek called "Sinjak Bek", which means Bek Liwa, and his 
military rank was 'rr.lir Liwa", 'Which means Amir Liwa. 
The Ottomans lei't the political and military powers of the pro­
vinces in the hands of the governor who was assisted by judges to ad­
ministrate justice, and a treasurer to ~ke oharge of taxes and other 
financial functions. 
Generally, the tribes were left out of the administratj,le arrange­
ments. With few exceptions, tribes were given fiefs to control and f~ 
Whom to 'collect', taxes. The tribes were administrated through their 
Shaykhs and Princes, 'Whose authorities the Porte recognized. Each 
S1aykh had to get the Porte r s approval upon taking over in his tribe. 
tiThe popul~tion of the following areas were not asked to serve in 
" 
the amy: (1) Constantinop~e, (2) Crete, (3) Islands of'the Mediter­
ranean Sea, (4) Tripoli, (5) Yem:en~ (6) Al-Hijaz .,,9 
n. THE OTTCJv!AN POLICY IN ARAB LANDS 
The Ottoman SUItans did not rule or administrate the Arab lands 
directly, but they appointed a Wali for each province (Wilayah), except 
for AI-Hijaz, 'tmich 't-vas treated differently because of its $ensitive 
religious position. ~l'he '1ialis had unljmited auth~rity in their pro­
vinces, and were only :interested :in being on good tenus with the SUltan 
and the high cfficials in Constantinople. 
The term of each Wali was one year, after which the Wali could be 
dismissed and returned to his horoe town, appo:inted to another office, or 
his tenn renewed. The short tem did not help to improve the conditions 
9Ibid., p. 251 
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of tho i')rovincc, since the Wali' s interezt would be to eet richer before 
his' termexnired, or he was dismissed by the Sultan. 
Each Wali had a court consisting of 'Ulama, high judge, trea3U~Gr, 
nobels and the army officers. The latter group interfered a lot in the 
affairs of the "province t cau:sing disturbances, and sometimes revoltine 
against the Wali. 
The Ottoman policy was never to interfere in the people's life and 
customs, unle~s ttwas necessary, and as long as the ~ubjects stayed 
. lOYBJ. to the SUltan and paid the ~axes. 
It is no doubt that the Ottoman r s policy had two sides. It helped 
the Arabs to keep their nationality and social and economic customs. It 
also gave freedom for each professional group to arrange and protect its 
interests. The policy also limited the function of the provincial gov­
ernment to collecting taxes and protecting the provinces, and never 
paid attention to other government functions such as education, economy, 
connnerce and health. The Ottoman' s policy of isolating the provinces 
from influence by the ideas of the European Renaissance 'forced the sub­
jects many years backwaro. 
III. THE OTTCMANADMINISTRATION OF ~-HlJAZ 
Al-Hijaz enjoyed greater autonamy than the other conquered Arab 
lands under the Ottomans ,who upon defeating the Mamluks in 1517 re­
ceived the Sharif of Mecca 1 s acceptance of their superiority, and in re­
turn, .the Ottoman Sultan Salim I kel;>t him in h~s office and oromised to 
keep the Sharifate in his family. 
~O~:At.;'C.5. J.n . .J!.l_,:"Hii~~. During the period we are concerned with, four 
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grouos Hith different interests played a role in determining the nolitics 
of AI-Hija 7.. 
Sha.r.:il Q,f. H.~_q.9_~, a Hasanide , was considered the ruler of all of . 
Al-Hijaz, with the seat of his Sharifate in }~ecca,and with}ledina under 
his rule. After the death of a Sharif, the Ashrafs would elect a Sharif 
to assume the responsibilities and the new Sharif had to write to the 
Sultan to get his Khul l a and Fannan of approval, which was to be read 
publicly in the Great Mosque. 
The Sharif had to please and serve the interests of some grouns 
such as the ottoman officials,. the'Shaykhs of the tribes, and the· Ash­
rafs. In attempting to do so, some Ashrafs were forced out by one of 
the groups, or by an alliance of two of them. In his attempts to secure 
his position, the Sharif of Mecca, as well as some of the influential 
Ashrafs had their 01in armies of slaves recruited mostly from Africa. 
At the beginning, the Sharif enjoyed a free hand in dealing vTith 
the affairs of his Sharifate, and had only to deal with· two Turkish 
officials~ a jud~e and Muhtasib. He also enjoyed great income from re­
ceiving half of the custom dues of the port of Jeddah, but constant 
collision over the mentioned customs forced the SuItan to appoint a 
Turk to the nevT office of Shaykh AI-Harm Al-Makki, which worsened rela­
tions more • However, the ottoman Sultans tried to improve their rela­
tions w~th the Sharif and somet:imes ruled in favor of the Sharif in his 
disputes with Turkish officials. 
$h.C3.rif Q.fJ1~Q.~~, a Husaynid, was confinnedin his appointment 
by. the Sharif. of !-1'ecoa. However, both Sharifs had nominal authority in 
Medina, beoause "the real authority was in the hands of Shaykh Haram 
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Al'-}!.1dani, who was supposedly a Turkish 'Al:im. n1 0 
'J1l_~_T}!Z:~.~}'-..1!..9_:rtl:.ci~Js ':interest was to assert the Turkish author-
i ty, and to check the authority of the :~'harif. Among the :important 
Turkish officials 'torero: 1) \\}'ali of Jeddah, the first Ottoman official 
to be appomt'ed in Al-Hijaz, and tlhe resided in Jeddah which became the 
seat oftllyalat Al-Habash u11, which mciluded some ports on the African 
Coast, such as Musawa 
' 
and Sawakin. The Ottomans estimated the produc­
tion of Iyalat Al-Habash at 180, 000 Ak<;te~~, and made Jeddah the base fran 
which exped~tions ,rere sent to Yemen and beyond. The Turkish Wali re­
ceived his orders from the Wali of Egypt, and was, assisted by the 
Sharif of Mecca's representative who had nominal authority. 
2) Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Makki, was the post created when disputes m­
~ , ­
creased between the Sharif and the Wali of Jeddah. The official was 
supposed to be a Turkish 'Alim wh,a resided in Jeddah. The Shaykh' s job 
was to be aspy on the Sharif, and to write directly to the Porte. 
3) Shaykh Al-H~ram AI-Madani was a Turkish I Alim, who was actually 
the rea~ governor of Medina, and contacted the SUltan directly. He was 
supposed to be over sixty-three years old, and his salary was equal to 
that of the' Grand Vizir. 12 Shaykh Al-HaramAl-Madani held a meeting 
every Friday to discuss' problans. 13 
, 4) Both ~udges of Mecca and Medina were supposed to be Turkish. 
10Ahamd Al-Khiyari, 'r UlTl.?-...r!!.~.Jll-Madin~h Was H':lkamalL1i~ 'Ahd AI:. 
Nowbo~![?.hJiatta AI-Y0.:9!l1 (}1edina, Saudi Arabia: 19620. 19. 
11 Al-Husari, 0'0. cit., p. 239 ..
-_._­
,12Al -Khiyari• .2l2.. cit., p. 20. 
13rbid., p. 20. 
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They served one year terms, after which they would be moved. 
'5) The Muhtasib had to be Turkish. The job of this official was 
to enforce justice .. and to serve as a treasurer. 
6) Other Turkish officials of less importance were the Turkish 
representatives who assisted the Sharif' srepresentative's in small' 
to'tms. 
The day-to-day confrontation between the local Ashrafs and the 
Turkish officials led to disturbances and disorders which will be dis­
cussed in the chapter dealing with the chronology of the Ashrafs of 
Mecca. 
Th~ l.~iq~ 1-J'ere unlike the above groups which could be controlled 
and contained. The tribes, however, were hard to control and please. 
Generally, th~ tribes consider ·::'her.lse~ves free men, and refused to 
recognize any autho~ity. The Ottomans did not assign fiefs to the 
tr.ibes of Al-Hijaz, as they did with some tribes 1n Syria and Iraq. 
However, the tribes of Al-Hijaz had already established their own areas 
of interest earlier. They had control of the commercial routes, as well 
as the pilgrimage routes. Because of this control,and their contin­
uous riads, the authority, Sharifit$i.. or Turkish, concluded agreements 
. . 
with them to keep order, and to use their manpower in military cam­
paigns.· '!he ottcmans and the Sharifs tried to please, the tribes with 
payments, supplies and exemption from taxes. 
government 1n Al-Hijaz (Sixteenth Centu:rx) As :was shown above, the two 
main authorities in AI-Hijaz were the Sharif of Mecca and the Turkish 
officials, and both exercised their authority in the towns only while 
the tribes l-rere in control of the desert and land routes. 
22 
The functions' of th~ government of Al-Hijaz were as follows: 
1) Pilgrmage, the main function, and the most nnportant. It was for 
the government to protect the pilgms during the pilgrimage se.ason, to 
make it easy for them to perform their religious duties and to provide 
them with the needed supplies of food and water. The most difficult 
part was to protect the pilgrimS outside of towns from tribal attacks. 
In order to do so, the government assigned guards to each pilgrimage 
caravan, and established military posts on the pilgrimage routes. 
2) Law and order, disturbances and disorders occured in towns 
either by a cminal accident, or a fight between the slaves or men of 
some Sharifs. In the case of fights among the Ashrafs I men, lithe Sharif 
of Mecca usually decided the punishment either by executing some of the 
" 
participants or expelling the accused Sharif to some areas such as 
Jizan or. Yunbu I • II 14 
In the case of criminal acts, the Turkish judges'administered the 
justice, ol0iered the punishment, and ordered the Muhtasib to carry out 
the punishment. 
There is no record of an existance or a city police, except 
for the Sharif's men who would tour the town. In keeping oroer 
at night, it is reported that the people of each section of the 
town organized guards called nWajaks ll to guC\rd against theives 
and criminals.1.5 
In order to keep order outside of towns, the government had to deal 
with the tough tribes, and the only way to punish them was either to 
master enough troops or to wait until the smnmer when the tribes usually 
settle in their areas of control. In order to protect the towns, walls 
·14 t t 279
•Al-Siba..i, 2l2.~<!.l:._., p.. 

1Ci... .

"'Ibid., p. 280. 
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werebu1lt, such as the wall of Medina, which Sultan Suliman ordered to 
be buil,t in 1532. It was completed in 19r3• 
.) Health, education and welfare are the responsibilities of a 
modern, or any responsible, government, ,it is clear. However, the gov­
ernment of Al-Hijaz played a small role, if any, in this area. However, 
this was the way earlier and later governments acted, until the twen­
tieth century. 
There is no record of hospitals or any governmental activities in 
the field of hEtalth. But records show that the' Ottomans established a 
military hospital in Jizan toward the end of th.e seu:.enteenth century. 
The annual pilgrimage .season was, and still is, a season of diseases be­
cause of the diseases carried to the Holy lands by the pilgrims. The 
It, 
only medic,ine was the one prescribed by the bedums, or the self-called 
phySicians, 't-Thich did not help to improve the health situation. "It is 
reported that aiL knee disease appeared in Mecca in 1629-1630, and made 
. some people unable to stand or to walk, and the local physicians pre­
scribed lemon juice as a medicme for it. u16 
There is no record of any kmd of a modern school system, but 
records. show that If every mosque, large and small, 1:lad a primary or 
reading school where pupils studied reading, writmg, Arabic and the 
Koran. u17 
IISome local Shaykhs established small schools called 'kuttab l 
which taught the Satnle, subjects and other subjects, such as grammar, 
16Ibid., p. 252. 
,17sydney Fisher~ Th.ELJ-iidc!le E~st (New York, New YOrk, USA: 1966), 
p. 214. . . 
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poetry and religious subjects."18 The four sects of 'the Sunni division-­
Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi I i-- had regular meetines that were 
held in the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the Prophet t s 'Mosque in Medina 
to teach relir,ious subjects. 
'In the area of llclfarc, the f,ovemment played a greater role than, 
'in the arens of health and education. Regular supplies were sent to the 
people of Mecca and l-1edina, and money was sent to be distributed among, 
the poor. The ottomans paid attention to the problem of water in Hecca, 
so 1'later 'VIas dug from nearby wells and springs. In, ~ 543, Sultan S'ulima.n 
AI-Qanuni (the 1·fagnificent) ordered the renewal of the Prophet's l·iosque 
in H~dina. In 1575, Sultan Selim II ordered the renewal of the Great 
'Hosque in Hecca. In 1630, the .hard rain cau.sed damages to AI-Ka 'ba, so 
Sultan 1v1uraci IV ordered the rebuilding of it. 
To support, supply and finance the poeple of Mecca and Hedina, 
there 't'lere two kinds of~vaqf. 1 )Awqaf AI-Haramin: These were pro-pcr­
ties in Egypt, as well as in other areas, that 't..rere made ,Avrqaf 'by the 
Ottoman Sultan, and fran its incomes, the people of the two holy cities 
were 'supported vTith goods and money. 2) Awqaf Ahliyah: These t'lere 
properties that were made Awqaf by some wealthy people to serve the 
sarne purpose. 
4) Defense was significant since the Ottomans paid great atten­
tion to protecting the Holy lands, especially with the presence of the 
Portu[;uese threat, 1.;hicl1 will be dealt '"''lith in a later cha.pter. A ~ar-
rison uas stC:.tioned in Jeddah, and much later in Hecca and Nedina. The 
Ottoman fleet was very active and succeeded in clearing the Red Sea 
18Al...SibaJi, OD. cit., p. 281.
_. -,-- .-~.-
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from the Fortup;ucs c. The Sharif was able to gather a large amy by c:11­
ling fo~ t.Tihad uhen the Portuguese threatened. Jeddah in 1541. 
5) Economy' vTas ,bas~d on jmport. Because of climatic reasons, 
Al-Hljaz. is. not, and was not, known for its agricultural production. 
It always had to import its bas1lc supplies from the outside. Hecca de­
nended completely on food supplies from Eeypt, while Medina was able to 
satisfy the need of .its population by its O'tlID agricultural production. 
After the Ottomans succeeded in making the Red Sea an Ottoman Lake, they 
tried to encouraee trade through Jeddah by opening the 'Port to· Euronean 
ships, on the condition that the ships never pass Jeddah, even if they 
carried goods for Egypt,. and insisted on carrying those goods on ships 
o'tmeci by Huslims only. 
The sources of the revenue were the pilgrims, the customs of the 
port in Jeddah, and the taxes. Unfortunately, I was not able to locate 
any records in Arabia. I was also unable to find any budget of Al-Rijaz 
during the period. Rov/ever, the budget of Egypt of 1596-1597 provided 
me with a long list of interesting articles that concern Al-Hijaz. 
FRG1 THE BUOOEr OF EGYPT 1596-159719 
The Purpose amount of 
Paras 
1 • For the poor of Hecca and Medina 350,244­
2. For the 'expenditures of Mecca and Hedina 1 ,731 ,253 
3. For the customar,y payment to provide for expendi­
tures of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage (1005 H) 
400,000 
19stanford Shaw', 'J:Jl(tJ!141L~LC?f Ott<?m'Yl~.i (Paris. France: 
1968), PD. 154-169. 
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The Purpose lUTlount of 
Para::> 
4. 	 For the customary paymont to the messenger who brinp;s 1 ,800 
the news of tho pil~rim 1 s departure fran the Hount of 

, f Arafat ' 

5. 	 For the cuntomary po.yment to provide for the banquet 14,000 
of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage when he comes 
to Birket-ul Hac ( 1005 H) , 
6. 	 For the equi'l:lnent needed to guard the pilgrims while they 1,600 
go and come at Birket-ul Hac, provided by Za J1m of Cairo 
7. 	 For the hire of camels to carry the money sent to 1, 61J·G 
Abdul-Halim Efendi, judge of Medina 
8. 	 For the hire of camels to carry the wheat sent as alms 320,210 
and th'e money for the people of the Holy Cities 
9. 	 For the hire of measures of the -ymeat sent as alrnsi by 4,000 
the Sultan 
10. 	For the o·ffering sent to Sb'arif Hasan, Emir of Mecca' 2,400 
11. 	For the hire of camels to carry the money sent 'to 4,800 
Sayid Rakim, :EJnir of Yunbu J, from Cairo to the port 
of Suez 
12. 	For the hire of camels along the road of the Holy Pil- ~j74, 125; 
grirnage in the name of the Ev.lad-i Azm (tribe) for the 
years 1005-1006 H 
1J. 	For the customary payment to the guide's along the road of .580 
the Holy Pilgrimage 
14. 	For the payment of freieht on the ship Gulgani under 13,400 
·the captainship of· Mebmet Reis 
i5.,For the price of wheat and barley for the Arab tribes 20,500 
along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, for the year 
1005 H . 
16. 	For the customary payment to the emin and scribe in 2,000 
charge of taking the money to the people of the Holy 
Cities (Emin-i SUrre and Katib-i SUrre) , 
17. 	For the pric~ of bowls for the lamps in the sacred place 1,205 
of ·worship 
18. 	For the' pension of 1Abdul Karim Semhude, who is Khatib 3, 166 
(preacher at Friday prayer) of Medina 
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'Toe Purpose Amount of 
Paras 
19, For the hire of ~ tailor to sew the skins of the sable 041 
robe sent to Sharif Hasan, Emir of Mecca 
20. 	 For the customary payment of the Commander (Serdar) 5,000
, of the men of Gonullus and Tufenkcian-i SUvTari Corps 

and others (who' guard the pilgrimage) at thetfme of 

the pilgrims departure ' 

21. For 	the supplies and foods for the poor and indigent 12,3CO 
(living) along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, set 
aside by order of the governor of Egypt 
22. For 	the pension of the commanders of the sweepers 23,760 
in Mecca 
23. For 	the customary payment for Sharifs at the port of 400 
Jeddah 
24. 	Fo~ the customary payment to provide provisions for 24,600 
the.new ship assigned to carry the loads of the leader 
of the Pilgrimage to Jeddab 
25. 	For supplies for the chief of the sweepers in the 2,870 
Prophet's Mosque 
26. For 	the hire of camels to transport candles for the 4,305 
Holy Cities and to transport the Holy Curtain 
27. For equipment needed 	to arrange the well at the fort 2,000 
Wejh on the road of the Pilgrimage ' 
28. For 	the custoiuary payment to the Ashrafs of Bani 197, 225 
Husayn in Medina and for Beduins to keep security 
of the road of the pilgrimage, and for the learned and 
the orphans in the Holy Cities 
29. For 	the customary payment to the tribe charged with 1 ,000 
ke,eping security at the well of the fort of Wejh 
30. 	Fo~ the price of bees' wax to be sent to the Holy 6,560 
Cities ' 
31. 	 For the freight costs for the wheat alms sent by the 3,075 
Sultan and for the rations for the peo~le of Mecca 
(for the year 1003 H) 
32; 	For'the tailor to sew the cloth and robes for,the Beduins 1,652 
along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage 
28 
The Purpose Amount of 
Paras 
33. 	For supplies for the tent Beduins along the road of the 1.310 
Holy Pilgrimage . 
The above articles of the budget of Egypt . show something of what 
the Ottoman govornrent ,~~'":c t.o send to AI-Hijaz. and it shows the vast 
interest given to the people of Mecca and Medina, and to keeping order 
on the roads of the pilgrimage. As it was' indicated in the budget, most 
of the articles were paid or sent customarily,; 
CHAPTER V 
THE RULERS OF AL-HIJAZ 
1520-1632 
The reader of this chapter on the rulers of, Al-Hijaz during 1520­
1632 will notice that it is a chronology of the Ashrafs of Mecca. The' 
reason for that is that the Ottoman Sultans appointed them as rulers of 
Al-Hijaz; with the exception of Jeddah, and they used Mecca as their 
residence and seat of government. 
I. SHARIF BARAKAT II (1496-1.502, 1503-1524) , 
When the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (The Grim) conquered Egypt in 
1517, Shar~f Barakat II was the Sharif of Mecca for twenty-one years, 
disrupted only for a short period. After entering Cairo, "Sultan 
Selim I freed some Meccan nobles Who were imprisoned by the Mamluk 
Sultan 'Al-Ghouri earlieru20 and '!\iras plarming to send an army to the 
Arabi~ Peninsula to exPel the Mamluks from Al-Hijaz and Yemen ..21 and 
. 
to ~ccupyMecca and Medina so he could claim the title "Hami Al-Haramin lt 
or the Defender of the Two Mosques. But a Meccan judge named Salah 
Al-Din Bin Zuhairah22 , who was freed by~ltan Selim I from Al-Ghouri's 
20Mohamad Anis,Al-Dowleh AllUthmaniyallWa AI-Mushrig AI-'Arabi 
1514-1914 (Cairo, Egypt: 1923), p. 127 
21 As'ad Ttla.s, Tarikh Al-Ummah Al-'Arabiyah (Beirut, Lebanon,: 

1963), p. 131. ' 

, 22Qutb Al-Din Al-Hanafi, Tarikh Makkah (Mecca, saudi Arabia: 
1950 ), p. 241 
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jail, told the Sultan that Sharif Barakat II would be glad to declare ' 
his loyalty to the Ottoman SUltan, and,the judge asked the SUltan 'to 
write to the Sharif. 
Sharif Barakat II heard the news of the fall of the Mamluksand 
,received a letter from the victorious Ottoman Sultan, and another let­
ter from the judge advising him to, join ,the Ottanans and to send his 
son Abu-Noumi II to the Ottoman SuI tan in Cairo. 
Sharif Barakat sent his thirteen year old son, Abu-Nomni II, to 
Cairo "were he was well received and well treated by Sultan Selim I, 
and was sent. back to l1ecCR as the co-ruler with his father."2) SuItan 
Selim I orclered that "half of the income of Mecca and Jeddah be paid 
to the two Sharifsevery year". 24 
, Sharif Barakat II received an order from SUltan Selim I to kill 
the Mamluk Commander in Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi, because of his ill-
treatment of the population of Jeddahwhile building the Wall of 
Jeddah .• ' IISharif Barakat tricked Al-Kurdi into coming to Mecca where, 
he,was captured and sent back to Jeddah where he was drowned in the 
sea ...25 
When the Ottoman representative arrived in Jeddah he found a large 
. 
number of armed ships arid an arsenal of arms which were left behind by 
the Mamluks. His mission was to expel the remaining Mamluks who fled 
to Yemen, so he decided to follow them. He obtained pennission from 
the Wali of Egypt, and also a promise of assistance from Sharif 
.. 23Ib~d., p. 241. 
24Taj AI-Dini Al-Khatib.• Manayih AI-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa 
Wullat AI-Haram (Mecca, Saudi, Arabia: 1125 H), p. 51. 
, 
25An1S, ·' op. C1,·t.,.p '127'• 
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Barakat' II. The Wali of Egypt appointed the merchant AI-Khawaja Qasim 
Al-Sharwani to the post of Wali of Jeddah•. 
Sharif Barakat II maintained good relations with the Ottomans. In 
1520 he received Al-.Mahmal AI-Masri led by the Turkish Commander Muslih 
Bek, 'Who after settling down, distributed among the people of Mecca, 
money and goods which were given away by Sultan Selim I. Arter the con-
elusion of the Pilgrimage ceremonies in Mecca, Muslih Bek left for 
Medina to destribute the same things among the population of Medina. 
In 1 520, Sultan Selim I died and, was succeeded by his son SuItan 
Suliman AI-Qanuni (The Magnificent). Upon hering the news, Sharif 
Barakat II sent a message to Sultan Sul1man express1Dg his sorrow f()r 
Selim r s death, and congratulating Sul:iman. The Sultan replied by con­
,. 
firming Barakat II and his son Abu-Noumi II in their posts in Al-Hijaz. 
in 1524, Sharif Barakat II died and was buried in l·!ecco.. He died 
after tuling Mecca as a sole ruler and co-ruler with his father, bro­
thers and son for fifty-three years. 
II. SHARIF ABU -NOlJIl11 ,II (1524-1,566) 
After the death of Barakat II, the Ashrafs of Mecca elected his 
son Abu-Noumi II, who was the co-ruler, to succeed his father to the 
Sharifate.. The new Sharif "sent a message to the ottoman, Sultan 
Suliman, infonnine him of his father's death and his election and the 
SUItan repl ied by confinning his election11.26 
Sharif Abu-Noumi II is considered the great grandfather of the 
Banu Baraka tbranch of the Ashrafs. 
26AI-Khatib, Ope cit., p. 56. 
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He limited the succession to the Sharifate of Hecca in his 
line of family. He also set u? reRulations for the relations 
between his descendants and punishments if-someone of them 
broke out the rer.ulations. 27 
His re~ime 't.as known for its stability because he was firm a~ld feared 
by the tribesmen and respected by the Ottomans. In rulinp. AI-Hijaz, 
"Sharif Abu-Noumi II ussd as his co-rulers, one at a time. two of his 
sons;-- Ahmad and Hasan~.28 Before the period of Abu-Noumi II, the 
Sharif of Mecca used to send his men to call upon the pilgrims to re­
tumt,o their countries after the end of the p~lgrimage ceremonies, but 
Abu";'Noumi II changed this policy and many pilgrims decided to stay in 
Mecca instead of going back to their home countries" which, resulted in 
the increase of the population of Mecca. The reason for the change of 
policy could-be that Abu-NoUln1 thought that. those pilgrimS who' stayed 
would help the economic life by establishing trade ties with their 
home lands. 
The first confrontation between the Ottomans and the local people 
took place less than two years after Abu-Noumi II took over. In 1526 
Salman Reis 29 landed in Jeddah with four 'thousand Turkish soldiers on 
their way to. Yemen. After landing. the soldiers began robbing the peo­
pIe,. causing disturbances and demanding more supplies. which c,aused 
prices to rise. Some of the soldiers left for Mecca where they forced 
people from their houses., This angered the Beduins because the expelled 
owners were originally Beduins. The tribesmen'began attacking and kill­
ing the soldiers outside of the towns. Abu-Noumi interfe·red and pre­
,27Al-Siba ti, OPe c'it., pp. 238-239. 
281'Q.id ., P. 239. 
'29 dAI-Khatib, 2.12.t.. cit., p. :.JV. 
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vented the Beduins from killing the soldiers. The people of !J;'ecca COTn­
plained to a certain Shay't<h named l-fohamad Bin 'Irak30,. who called the 
leaders of the soldiers to the Great Mosque and demanded an explanation 
of their behavior. The leaders claimed that they were going to leave 
after'the Pilr.;ri:m:age season. "The Shaykh ordered them to leave 11ecca to 
Mina, and to execute the so19iers causing the troUble'. Then Commander 
SalmanReis took for himself the, dues of the custom of Jeddah, which was 
reported to be "90,000 golden dinars in that yearn.31 
DUring this period of disturbances, two uncles of Sharif Abu-
Noumi II rebelled against his rule and ,sought the cooperation of Salman 
Reis, who refused. Abu-Noumi II sent a small expedition to arrest them, 
but a certain commander named Jouhar AI-Maghribi32 mediated and the re-
I>, 
bellionended peacefully. The Sharif did not make the pilgriri:age that 
year t instead he kept ,a watchful eye to prevent fighting between the 
Beduins and Salman I s forces. When the Pilgrimage ceremonies concluded, 
the.. Turkish forces left for Yemen. This period of disturbance "was long 
afterward remembered and called the 'year of Salman', the name of the 
Turkish Commander.")3 
In 153?-1538,Abu-Noumi II led his amy into Jizan, south of Al­
. 
Hijaz, occupied it and appointed his own ruler. 34 But in the following 
30 ' 
Ibid., p. 57. 
31Ibid., ~. 58. 
32 
Ib'=.<!. , 
' 
,p. 58. 
33Gerald De Gaury~ Rulers of Mecca (London. Great Britain: 1951) 
p. 128. 
,.34AI-Khatib, OPe cit., p. 59. 
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year~ .1539, the Turkish Commander Suliman Pasha AI-Khad im na!'Js8d throur:h 
Ji7.nn, retunlinp: from Yemen and forced the Sharif's renresentative out, 
and A.nDointed a Turkish ruler. Al:"Khadi'1l and his troops cnmned in Jeddnh 
and stayed waitinp; for the Pil grimage season. During their stay, Al-
Khadim and his forces behaved badly and showed little respect for the 
Holy City. After the co~clusion of Pilgrimage ,ceremonies, Al-Khadim 
and his forCes left for Istanbul, and with them went Ahu-Noumi' s son 
Ahmad. who was well received by Sultan Suliman, and was appointed as 
a co-ruler with his father. Later Ahmad d,ied, and the other son, Hasan, 
served ,as a co-ruler with Abu-Noumi II. 
In the year 1541, the ·Portuguese attacks increased in the Red Sea, 
but failed to land at Jeddah because of its strOng walls and defenders, 
although th ey , 
succeeded in landing at a small port called Abu AI-Dawa'ir 

near Jeddah. Abu-Noumi II left the Pilgrimage and called 

for Jihad (Holy War) among the people who answered in great 

numbers. After anning them, he led them to Abu Al~Dawa 'ir 

and succeeded in expelling the Portuguese. Sultan Suliman 

reacted to the news by sending more bounty and 'confirmed 

the Sharif's right of half the custom dues of Jeddah.35 

In 15$}, the Turkish ItAmir Al..:.Hajrr Mahmoud Pasha arrived in }fecca 
to lead the Pilgrims. 
Because he vlas, not well received by Abu-Noumi II a few 

years earlier, he started disturbances and called for the 

dethroning of Abu-Noumi. Fighting broke out between the 

Turkish forces and Abu-Noumi I s in Mina. The Beduins took 

advantage of the situation and began attacking the pilgrims 

which disturbed the Pilgrimage Ceremonies.' Abu-Noumi led 

his fo~gs and defeated the Beduins and the Turkish 

forces. j 

35rbid., Pp. 69-70. 
~ 
36Al-Siba' i, 2£•• cit., PP. 239-240. 
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It. is not clear how Sultan SuI1man received the true facts of the inci­
dent, but it. could be assumed that either the Turkish judge in Mecca 
or Shaykh AI-Haram ~-Makki reported to the SUltan. As a result it is 
reported that lithe Sultan wrote to Sharif' Abu-Noumi apologizing for 
J.1:ahmoud Pasha's behavior and indicated tha.t the Pasha was punished. n37 
In. 1552, the Sharif of Medina, Mani', stopped customary payments 
to some Ashrafs and tribes of the area aroWld Medma, which made them 
angry and they dec ided to force the contmuation of the payments. It 
is reported that 
they waited until the pilgrimS trom Medina reached a small 

village called AI-Firaish on their way to Mecca and engaged 

them in a battle called the "Waqi t at of Al-Fira:Lsh." The 

Midinise included the Turkish Judge of Medina and Shaykh 

AI-Harem AI-Madani who mediated and promised the restora­

tion of their payments. The outlaws let the Medinese con­

tinue to Mecca where they informed the Sharif of the in­

cident. The Sharif sent strong guards to protect them on 

their way back to Medina. 38 . 

Regarding the mentioned incidents, it can ·be noticed clearly that 
all of them occurred during the Pilgrimage season when Mecca usually 
would be overcrowded and it would be difficult to keep law 'and order. 
The religious duty of performing the pilgr:image was used by the Turks 
as a reason to stay and create problems in Mecca by seizing supplies 
or attacking people's properties. However, not all Turkish forces be­
haved this way. Sane behaved well and showed greater respect to the 
.Holy places. Such forces as the forces led by Sinan Pasha in 1.569 were 
among these. 
Besides trying to keep matters under control, Sharif Abu-Noumi II 
37 .Ibid., p•.~O •. 
38Ahmad Al-Baradi r i,. Al-Madinah Al-MWlawarah 'Ibr Al-Tarikl'L.A;l­
l;g.ami (Beirut, I.e bulon: 1972), pp•.126-127. 
devoted his time to improving the conditions in Mecca by building alms­
houses, pilgrim Khans, schools and courts, and water channels between 
the hills and Mecca. In order to do that he was greatly helped by the 
Sultan's bounty and his right to half of the custom dues of Jeddah • 
. liThe Sharif's reputation for sanctity and good work grew and his style 
became the 1 Star of Religion f or Najm Al-Din". 39 
In 1,566, because of old age and bad health, Sharif Abu-Noumi II 
asked 'the SuItan's pennission ,to retire from his office and to appoint 
his son Hasan, then co-ruler, to become theShaJ;'if. The Sultan agreed 
and AbU-N'oumi II devoted his time to religious studies.' His son, how­
ever, continued seeldng his advice until Abu-Noumi,. II died in the year 
1584, and was buried in Mecca. 
III. SHARIF HASAN (1 566-1602) 
In 1566 Abu-Noumi II asked the ottoman Sultan SUliman to replace 
him with his son Hasan and the Sultan agreed. Sharif Hasan received 
the customary KhilfaAl-SUltaniyah and the letter of confinnation was 
read in the Great l-1osque, as was the custom. 
Sharif Hasan's period was considered an extension of Abu-Noumi f s. 
It was a pe nod of stability and there is no record of disturbances 
such as the ones durjng Abu-Noumi f 5 period. He showed a finnness in 
dealing with the Beduins and it is reported that the Beduins, because of 
their' fear of Hasan IIwould swear falsely by anyone or anything except 
the name of Sharif Hasan. rt40 
. 39De Gaury, op cit., l'. 131. 

4Orbid.,. p.
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However,' Starif Hasan was very stem with the Ashrafs who were try­
ing to gain from their social position 1n the Meccan society. It is 
also reported that. because of the established law and order, "com­
me.rci~l caravans traveled without being accompanied by a guard. ,,41 
In t~e year 1.580, ,Sharif Hasan led his army of1 0, 000 men :into the 
Highlands of N'ejd and besieged Mi 'kal in Nejd42• After a long success­
ful exped'ition, he returned wealthier and accompanied by some captured 
chiefs. He kept the captured chiefs in his jail for a year and re­
leased them after they paid the money he wanted. He also appo:1nted 
, . 
Mohamad Bin Al-Faddl43 as their Amir (pr:1nce of chief).' The Ottomans 
didn~t interfere or oppose the Sharif's expedition in Nejd, but con­
tinued to oppose any Sharif's advances into Jizan south of Taif without 
any given reason except that the Ottomans felt that they could control 
the coastal area but not the tribal-controlled inland areas. 
As it ,became the custom of the Ashrafs, Sharif Hasan tried to 
gain recognition of his eldest son Mas loud as his co-partner in ruling 
Mecca; but Hasan's brother, Thaqabah, opposed such a move because he 
wanted the position for himself. The problanwas solved when the two, 
Mas loud and Thaqabah, died and Sharif Hasan received confirmation from 
. 
the Sultan to appoint his son Abu-Talib as the co-ruler. 
In the year 1581, Sharif Hasan led his army into Nejd because the 
local chiefs broke down earlier agreEments. He succeeded in defeating 
them and entered such towns and fortresses as Al-Kharj, Al-Badi f, AJ.­
41Al_Sibafi, o~. cit., p. 242. 

4~bid., p. 243.

-
43rbid" p. 243. 
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Salmiyah and 'Al-Amamiyah and appointed his own men to rule them. ''"'Nhen 
his spies informed him that the Bani Khalid tribe of Al-Hasa was pre-, 
paring to fight him, he marched to 'meet than midway between Nejd and 
Al-Hasa and defeated them. lI44 Sharif Hasan also partioipated in other 
expeditions to .other areas either to punish a chief or to expand his 
Sharifate. 
In the year 1.585, the keeper of Al-Ka 'ba IS key, Abdu1-Wahid A1-' 
Sha'ibi45 opened Al-Ka 'ba for the pilgrims and when he wanted to olose 
it he did not find the golden key. The gates of the Great Mosque were 
ordered to be olosed and the people were searched, but with no result. 
A fevl months later "Sinan Pasha, Governor of Ye~en found the key with 
a Persian in Yemen, oroered him to be killed and returned the key to 
". 
. its, keeper. 1146 The Pers1an.l:saotion oould be the result of the exist­
ing bad relation between the SUnniottoman and the Shi1i Safavids of 
Persia. 
In the year 1601, Sharif Hasan appointed 1Abdul-Rahman Bin I Atiq 
Al-Haddrami47 ,as his vizir. There is no record of any vizir before the 
period of Sharif Hasan, so it could be assumed that he established this 
office, copying the ottoman system to show that his position was equal 
to that of the ottoman Sultans. His vizir, Al-Haddrami, did not prove 
44Abdulmalik AI-Makki, Smitt Al-Nojourn Al-'Awa1i Fi Anba' A1-Awa'1 
Wa A1-Tawa1i (Cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 370. ' 
45A1-Siba 1 i, Ope cit., p. 243. 
46Al-Khatib, oR.. cit., p. 114. 
47Al~Makki,_oE cit., p. 382. 
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,to ,have the qualities 'and the characteristics of the important office 
he ,occupied.. Al-Haddrami was unfair in treatmg ,the people and became 
busy in getting wealthier by using forged documents to take over the 
inheritances of dead people. The subjects could not canplainto the 
Sharif Hasan, because the Sharif was under the influence of his vizir. 
In 1602, Sharif Hasan le~ Mecca on his way to ,another expedition jn 
Nejd, but he died in Nejd, and his body was brought back to Mecca to be 
buried. 
IV. ~Am:F ABU-TAtIB (1602-1604) 
When his father Hasan died, Abu-Talib was in Nejd. But he arrived 
in Mecca the, same day the body of his father arrived. The first thmg 
II, 
that he did after taking over was to arrest his father's vizir, Al-
Haddrami, to try him for the crminal acts he committed. tlAl-Haddrami 
committed suicide in jail and the people stoned him until his body was. 
48buried under stones. 11
Abu-Thlib IS reign was a short one and he tried to make the people 
forget Al-Haddrami's acts which blackened the histor,yof his father's 
rule. Because of Al=Haddrami's story,Abu-Talib never trusted his 
vizir and dealt with his subjects directly. He treated the outlaws with 
, firmness and became known for his justice. In the year 1604, when he 
was leading an expedition 1n the area of Biaha, Abu-Talib died and his 
body was sent back to Mecca for burial. 
V • SHARIF IDRrS ( 1604-1624 ) 
When Abu-Talib died in 1604 he did not leave any son to succeed 
48Al-Sibali, OPe cit.,p. 245. 
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him, .and the 'recoros do not show that ht3 had a co-partner in ruling the 
Sharifate. To solve the problem in the customary way, the Ashrafs of 
Mecca met and elected Sharif. Idris~ the son of Hasan, to succeed his 
brother Abu-Talib. The Ashrafs also selected Idris r brother Fuhaid, 
and nephew Muhsin to act as co-rulers with Idris. The results of the 
election were sent to t'Qe SUItans who replied by sending the letter of 
confinnation, and the customary Khil fa Al-S1lltaniyah. 
The new Sharif was a strong one and had a large personal army of 
slaves and Beduins, but his brother Fuhaid had the same' strength and 
soon occasional fighting broke out between the two groups. Earlier, 
Sharif Idris disagreed with his nephew Muhsin, ,so the latter left Mecca 
for Yemen. "Both brothers tried to put their men in the important
", 
. positions such as the position of Al-Muft.i".49 They continued fighting, 
and disagreements between the two ,brothers influenced Sharif Idris to 
ask his nephew to come back as his co-partner. The return of Muhsin 
angered Fuhaid who left to Turkey where he died in 1612-1613. 
After establishing his 0'Wll control in Mecca, Sharif Idris started 
sending and leading expeditions into the Highlahds of Nejd. It is also 
reported that "his armies reached near AI-Hasa, where the Turkish vlali 
invited them to accept his hospitality, but they declined and re­
turned." 50 
Back in JI:Iecca, the Ashrafs became dissatisfied with Sharif Idris' 
rule for the following reasons: 
1. Disagreements between Idris andMuhsi~. 
49Ibid.,'P. 247. 

50 4
I.~., p. 2 7. 
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2. Idris 1 dis respect for 1-!uhsin 1 s opinion. 
3. The increased demands of Idris' slaves. 
4. The unfairness of'Idris l vizir Ahmad Bin Younis. 
As a re sult 'of the d issa'tisfaction, the Ashrafs led by Sharif Ahmad 
declared a revolt to depose Idris and appoint Muhsin, and fighting 
broke out in the streets of Mecca. The position of Sharif Idris became 
endangered because of the defeat of his men. However, he did not show 
signs of accept:ing the Ashrafs I demands, but "his sister persuaded h~'1l 
to accept' and he agreed to leave Mecca in two months. n51 He left' Necca 
fora. place near the Mount of Shamar in Nejd, where he died tvlO months 
later'in 1624. 
The revolt of the Ashrafs of Mecca was the first recorded of its 
kind durin~ the period which led to the', fall ofa Sharif. As it vlas in­
dicated, the reasons were to gain more personal advantages by stopping 
the growing influence and strength of Idris. The leader of the revolt, 
Sharif Ahmad was a very ambitious manvmose aim was to, gain the position 
for himself, lJhich' he did later. The incident also shows the important 
role of the Sharif1s slaves to keep him in power or the opposite. 
VI • SHARIF MUHSIN ( 1624~1 628 ) 
, . 
''When Sharif, Idris accepted the demands to step down from the 
Sharifates the Ashrafs of Mecca sent a letter to the Porte aSking that 
the appointment of Muhsin be confirmed and the Porte agreed by sending 
the lettar of confirmation 'and Al~Khil'a. 
Durine the three years' of his reign, Sharif Muhsin was under the' 
"51 . 
, J:bid., p. 248. 
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influence of the leader of the revolt, ,Sharif Ahmad," who took control of 
the government and used Muhsin to achieve his goals. But, the other 
Ashrafs warned Muhs:in of Ahmad I s intentions, so Muhsin took control of ' 
the governmentbusinoss Which led to disagreement with Ahmad~ 
In 1627-1628, the new Governor Designate of Yemen, Ahmad Pasha, 

arrived in Jeddah. Because one of his ships with his personal luggage 

in it'was wrecked on a reef near Jeddah, and sunk in deep water, the 

'Pasha sent a message to Sharif Muhsin ask~g him'to send two divers to 
'recover his luggage. After several days' of ,diving "nothing was recov­
" .' . 
, ered, and Ahmad Pasha believed that Sharif Muhsin had ordered the diver~ 
not to recover the Pasha's luggage Bothe Pasha hanged the Sharif's 
, representatives in Jeddah. 1t.52 ,It is also reported that Sharif' Ahmad 
II. 
arrived 111 Jeddah at' the t:Une and was thought .to have poisoned the 

Pasha ~ s mind. In any 'case, the Pasha narrested and executed both the 

, , 
,Governor' of cJeddah 'and the messenger between him and the Sharif of 
Mecca. " 53 ,This' wa~J the first such incident of this kind and it showed 
. the weakness of Sharif Muhsin and the beginning of' the q.ecline of the 
Sharifate's influence. 
Sharif Ahmad wanted to take more advantage from the' Pasha I sanger 
. . 
and asked the Pasha fop money and. troops, to depose Muhsin and the Pasha 
agreed. Suddenly the Pasha died in Jeddah, but Ahmad declared 'himself 
a Sharif in Jeddah and led Turkish troops to at~ack Muhsin in', Mecca. 
Sharif Muhsin left. Mecca with an, amy t~ meet Ahmad 15 a,my, "but upon 
hearing the news of an uprising in Mecca led by $hari;t' Mas loud, the 'son 
52 ' ,Ibid .., P. 249. 

53De Gaury. OPe cit., p.' 133. 
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of Idris,n54 .Milhsin decided to retum to Mecca.' Muhsin's forces eng.aged 

.Has'oud1s forces in Mecca. and Muhsin's men deserted him; so heiled to 

Yemen 't'lhere he died in San I a' in 1628. 

VII. SHARIF AHMAD (1628-1629) 
After the defeat of Sharif Muhsin t s forces, Sharif Ahmad entered. 

~1ecca with his Turkish forces and declared hblself the Shar,if of Mecca. 

He sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan infonnillghim of the changes and 

, , the' Sultan replied by ~onfinriing him in the office. 
" 
The new Sharif's policy was to gain personal revenge from Sharif 
. Muhsin by imprisoning, exiling and killing the supporters of Muhsin in 
Mecca. One of the Meccan personalities. that Ahmad tortured in his jail . 
". 
was the M1sttti of Mecca, Shaykh' Abdul-Rahman Al-Murshidi.. It is re­

ported that Shari~ Ahmad tortu,red the Mufti because the 

.Mufti unreasonably prevented his (Ahmad's) marriage to one 

Sultana B:int 'Ali Shihab. and, moreover, during the ceremony 

of. her marriage to another had referred to Ahmad as· a' devil: 

lastly f that Ahmad had found, beneath a cushiOn on his . 

predecessor's couch a Fatwa against him by theM-q,fti • .5.5 
'After a long torture 'in Ahmad's jail, and because ,of the news of the near 
arrival of Amir Al:"Haj,. Ahmad ordered his men to, strangle the Mufti. 
Ahmad's polioy di$turbed the peac'e in the d'esert where the tribes­
men took advantage of the weak gover-nment and began attacking caravans 
and cutt'jng inland routes. In Mecca itself the soldiers otAhlllad at~ 
tacked people's houses, including the houses of sane Ashrafs and some of 
, " 
the soldiers entered the Great Mosque with their ·shoes.. At. the same time, 
54Al-Siba ' i, OR. cit." P.' 249 • 

.55De Gaury, op, . cit. , p. 133. 
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Sharif Ahmad tumed against some of his suppo'rters' and began torturing 
them, which frightened Sharif' Mas' oud, who earlier had helped Ahmad to 
dethrone Muhsin.· 
The news of the 'dis:turbances reached the Porte, which. oroered the 
newlY. appointEd Governor of Yemen, Qunsowhpasha56, who, was on his way 
to Yemen, to stop at Mecca and' punish Sharif Ahmad for the mulder of 
the Mufti. The Pasha reached Mecca, pretending that he came to make 
the Pilgrimage, and camped outside of'Mecca, where he was joined by 
Sharif Mas' oud, who feared for his life from Ahmad. After the, conclu­
sion of the Pilgrimage Ceremonies, Sharif Ahmad went to the 'Pasha's 
camp to pay his respect to the Pasha, and the Pasha persuaded him to 
I 
,enter one of his ten~s to play chessS7, wbere the Pasha's soldiers 
-. 
caught him. When the news of his arrest reached .Ahmad r s men, they re­
v~lted and .fighting broke out between them and the pasha' s army. To 
stop ,the fighting, the Pasha ordered Ahmad to be beheaded, and he 
showed the' head to Ahmad I s men, who then sur~ndered. ' 
.VITI. SHARIF MAS'OUD (1629) . 
While the fighting was going on between Ahmad's men and the Pa:;)ha r s, 
. 
Mas'oud returned to Mecca, took control of it, and declared himself the 
new Sharif. He was a weak and peace-minded Sharif, and Qunsowh Pasha 
took advantage of that and punished some, Meccans, and took over their 
properties. The danands of hi~ amy caused pr,ices to rise and goods to 
disappear in Mecca to The Pasha' also "put his hands on, the custom dues . 
. 56rbid~, p. 13:'''
-
.5'7Ibid ., p. 13S. 
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of Jeddah and .added all of it to the ottanan, treasury, and thus prevented 
the Sharif from a much needed :income".58 Sharif Mas I oud I s reign was a 
short. one, and he d,ied in early 1629. 
IX. SHARtF I,ABDULLAH (1629~16:30 ) 
, A:rter the death of Mas loud ,the Ashra.fs of Mecca m,et and elected 
the old 'Sharif I Abdullah Bin Hasan to the Sharifat~. The elected Sharif 
.refused to accept at first, but he then agreed :in order to' prevent a war 
of succession, and the Ottanan Sultan confirmed' his election in the cus~ 
, tomary way., His reign was marked by a stabUi~y that was needed atter 
a period of bloodshed and disturbances. The new Sharif stayed in office 
for one year,', and then decided to ret'1re in favor of his son Muhamad 
If, 
with zaid B:in. Muhsin as his co-ruler. 
X. SHARIF MUHAMAD (1630-1631) 
When the ottoman Sultan replied by confirming Sharif 'Abdullah's 
plan of appointing Muhamad and Zaid as co-rulers, 'Abdullah retired and 
turned, the Sharifate over to them. The new Sharif 'Muhamad. oroered the 
name of his fath'er. to be'mentioned in the Khuttba59• In 1630, "the 
peop~e of the' town of Taif I-evolted and killed tlieir ~ariftr60' so 
Shar,if Zaid (co-ruler) led an amy which' attacked Taif and put down the 
revolt• 
. The two co-rulers cooperated with each. other, which bothered some 
". ,', 
58Al-Sibali, 012, cit. t, p. 262. 
59Ibid.,· p. 253. 
6O:rbid. ,pp. 253-254. 
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of the Ashrafs, who thought that Zaid had no right to be a co-ruler. 
They' tried' to tum Muhamad 'aga~st . Zaid to 'dismiss him and appoint one 
of his' brothers inst.ead, but Sharif .Muhamad .refused, which cost him the. 
loyalty of some of the Ashrafs such as Nami Bin " Abclu1-Mutta1ib. 
At that time, the Ottomans were badly de·feated in Yemen, and the 
remaining Turks fled Yemen to the north. 'When Nami heard of their ar­
riv~ ~ QUnfudhah, he lett Mecca for Qunfudhah, where he succeeded in 
persuading the soldiers to join him in attacking Mecca. The soldiers 
marched until ~hey were ~ few mi1e~ from Mecca, and sent to the Sharif 
of ' Mecca that they should be permitted tO'enter Mecca. But the Sharif 
refused,. The 'soldiers marched into Mecca and engaged the army of the 
. . 
Turkish Sinjuk of Jeddah61 and the Meccan army,' led 'by the two co-rulers, 
II. 
in a battle which became known as Waqi' at Al-Jala1iyah. The fall of 
, ' 
Sharif Muhamadin the battle, led to the retreat of ,his army, and to, 

the fall of Mecca,1nto the hands of the Turkish soldiers arid Nami. 

At the same time, the co-ruler Sharif Zaid fled to the village of 

Badr and later to Medina where he began preparations to regain Mecca. ' 

XI., SHARIF NAMI (1631-1632) 
Nami entered Mecca'with the'Turkish soldie~, proclaimed himself 
the Sharif, of, Mecca, and appointed his cousin, ' I Abdul-Aziz Bin Idris, 
as the co-ruler. ' In the meantime, his friends the Turkish soldiers 
looted Mecca, seized food supplies, and, it is reported 
between them raped every virgin and every bpy in the city, 
those. of gentle birth being the, first, to be seized by the 
61De' Gaury, OPe cit., p~ 1)8. 
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lustier soldiers of lower grades. For a week they cont'?,nued 
forcibly to make the young' of both, sexes drung2 so with,' greater facility to indulge their wantonness., 
Th~ tribes took advantage of the situation, and began to ,revolt 
and looted the caravans on the way to Hecca. ' Heanwhile, "Sharif Nami 
asked the Sinjuk of Jeddah, Dollar Agha t t<? surrender ~e port, but he 
refused. ,,63 Nami sent h~s 'Co-ruler 'Abdul-Aziz with an army which en­
, , , 
tared J eddah, looted th~ houses and the stores t arrested Dollar A,gha 

and expelled him from Jeddah after tortu~ng him. 

XII. SHARIF ZAID (1632-1667) 
At .the sam,e time, Zaid in Medina sent his cousin with a report to 
the Governor of' Egypt, and asked for help to regain Mecca. The report 
, ~ , 
was sent to Sultan Murad IV, who ordered troops to ,be sent to aSSist 
Zaid, whom the sU1tan appointed as. the new Sharif. 'Sharif, Zaid re­
ceived 'Al-Khil r a Al-Sultaniyah in Medina and proceded to ytinbu ", to' lead 
the ottoman ,forces sent frOD:! Egypt. 
',Nami heard the news of ,the' coming troops, so he sent some men to 
scout the tro~ps, but, the troops 'captured and killed' some of them and 
the rest returned to Mecca and warned Nami.' As a result of their warn­
ing, Nami left Mecca with his Turkish friends' for Taraba. ,A lO,cal 
Sharif, Ahmad, Bin Katadah,' took control of 'Mecca. and' sent a message to' 
Sharif Zaid declaring' Mecca an open city, and w~ecoming the pew Sharif. 
The follovring day. Zaid entered Mecca. 
. , 
After the end of that year's pilgrimage season, Sharif Zaid sent 
62-' ,
-'"Ibid., p. '1 39. 

63Al-5iba li,op. cit., p. 255. 
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an .amy to Taraba. The amy besieged Ta~aba for a while ~ captured Nami 
and his brother, and brought them to Mecca. After interrogating them, 
. the ··mUlama gave a i'atwa that. the execution of Nami and his brother was 
pennitted, so the Sharif ordered both of' 
" 
them to be hanged. ,,64 
, 
In this paper we are not concerned with the period of Sharif Zaid, 
. ,.' ' 
who ruled, until 1667. ~is period was a period of stability, and he suc- " . 

ceeded in controlling the tribesmen because of" his fimness al}d the 

Turkish troops "that were under his command to establish law and order. 

He also, succeeded in getting the approval of the Ottoman SUltan' for re­
. . 
~uming to the' Sharif the right to half thecust<ll11 dues of Jeddah" which 

Qunsowh Pa,sha cancelled earlier. 

, . :.,. '; 
"" 
:-/ ...... 
\' 
64Ibid ., p. 2.56., 
,CHAPTER VI 
srRUGGLE, FOR SUPRPMACY IN 'THE RED SEA ' 
. SIXTEENTH CENTURY' 
=\= • RISTOR!CAL .BACKGROUND BEFORE THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
For nearly a thousand years, the Musl1ms controlled the overland 
and sea trade between the Orien~ and Europe. Muslim-controlled ships 
loaded with products, sailed from the 'Orient ~othe south of the Persian 
Gulf', am' f'rom there some ships sailed into the Persian Gulf' up to Basra 
in Iraq, where pro,ducts were transported on land to Syria, to be, ex­
", 
changed f'or products of' the Middle East and of' Europe. Some ships 
sail~d through the Gulf of' Aden into ,the Red 'SEa, and unloaded either 
, where they were 'exchanged. ,The trade between 'the Middle East and' 
Europe was controlled by the Venetians. ' 
The Muslim traders faced many dif'ficulties' suct?- as: 1 ) 'The winds 
in the sea, which controlled the sailing and the loading or unloading 
ports. 
2) The custom dues that the ,tradershacf. to pay at each port :at 
, ';'1 
which th~y stopped. 
:3) The BeciuinsWho i'orcedtheir own fees" for letting the products, 
pass overland. 
Toward 'the end of the fifteenth centurY. the importance, of, th,e 
50 
, overland routes was reduced because of the following reasons: 1) The 
":	enmity between the Mamluks of Egypt 'and the Safavids in Persia. ,The 
continued threats 9£ 'the Safavids, disturbed the land routes from Basra 
to Syria. 
2). The weakness of the Mamluks" which gave the Bedums a 'chance 
to demand more money. 
" The Muslim ,trad,ers faced the 'gre,atest threat in their monopoly in 
'14-98 when the Portuguese Vasco da Gama succeeded in reaching India by 
the route of the cape of Good Hope. And within a decade, the Portu~ 
. guese took control of InO,st of the trade, that the Muslims controlled for 
, 	 , 
a long time. The easy sea trade route 'by the cape ,of Goo,d Hope "per­
, mitted the Port~guese to sell the goods 'cheaper t'Q'an the Muslim 
' .. , 
.,' 
,trade~s.1I65 
" ,The rivalry of the Muslims and the Portuguese for the ,trade of the 
Orient was, not the only reaso~ for the unfriendly relations between 
them. other important reaspns' were: 1} their different religions; 
2) the Portuguese hate for'the Arabs who ruled t1'lem fora, l~ng time; 
3) the fall ,of Constantinople into the htIDds of,: the 'Muslims 'in 14-53, 
and 4-) the wa~ waged against the'Muslims in North Africa by Spain, ani 
. 
,Portugal. 	
, 
II. THE RED SEA IN THE SIXTEENrH CENTURY, 
In the year' 1:J.)O, the Portuguese destroyed the ships of some 
Muslim merchants at the port of Calcutta. The followmg year, the King 
of Portugal decided to prevent the Muslims .from getting spices from 
65z • .Al41ahas:ini and M. Sharif, Dirasat Tarikhi:vah f1 Al-Nahddah 
Al-'Arabiyeh Al-Hadithah(cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 190. 
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India by' either paying the Indians 'more for,their gocids, or by destroying, 
}tusltm ships. In 1502,' Portuguese ships seized the port of Kilwa on the 
eastern coast of Ai'rica, arid in 1503, another Portuguese fleet was sent 
to block the entrance of the Red Sea to all Muslim ships. 
The se acts of war wer~ challenges that the then defenders of Islam, ' 
the Mamluks were faced with. :Eht they were in no good position at that , 
tinie' t~ answer because of the' following reasons: 1) the Mamluks were 
soldiers not' sailors'; 2) the Mamluks did not have ,~he needed wood to 
bu1ld a ,fleet; :3 ) the need to import the other needed m~terials and 
engineers, and 4)' the existing ships of Mu~lim merchants were no match 
for the ,Portuguese's. Because of ,the above reasQls, 'the Malnluks made n~ 
attempt to build a fleet. 
-, 
The success of the Portuguese not only le~ to hostilities with the 
Huslinls, but also led to, the, shift of power and wealth from the European 
countries on the Mediterranean Sea to the, Western European countries.' 
, I' , 
The shift affected the· Venetians and the Italians which forced them to 
aid the Muslims in the early stages of the struggle, "by Supplying the 
~' , 
Mamluks with'woed and engineers.,,66 
The Portuguese asked the, Venetians to transfer their business from 
Egypt to Lisbon, but the 'venetians found that such a transfer would be 
disastrous, so ~hey refused. Instead they asked the Mamluk Sultan to 
incite the Indian Musl:1lns and to reduce the dues paid in Egypt. The Si.ll­
tan refused, and sent a messenger to, Rome to "threaten ,he would destroy 
the 
, 
Holy places in Jerusalem, ,,67 if the 
, 
Portugu~se contmued to threaten 
66 ' ,Al-Ansari, OPe cit.,. p. 127. 
67U .K. Adm'iralty~ 'vestem Arabia' and the Red 'Sea (London, Great 

Britam: 1946), p. 2,58. 
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~';uslim shins. In 1504, the Venetians advised the Mamluk Su.ltan to dig 
\la, canal' from the ~iediterranean to the Red Sea. ,,68 Such a canal would 
: . 
have reducErl the value of ,the Portueuese controlled cape of Good Hope 
route, but the project never was done, although there are reports 
that some d~ggmg was going on in late+,; t·imes. The inability of the 
Harnluk SuItan to anSVler the Portuguese I s threats forced the Venetians 
·to withdraw their help grad~ally. 
" In 1505, the Portuguese sailed, into the Red Sea and came up to 
Jeddah, the 'POrt of Mecca, but made no at~empt to attack it•. This in­
cident,alarmed the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghouri that the holiest Islamic part 
was in danger, and so was his own prestige as the protector of'Islrun. 
Al-GhQurio:rd.ered a fleet to, be built, and the Venetians supplied him 
with the needed wood~ At the same time, the Portuguese occupied some 
important islands and ports in the Indian Ocean, and tried to take ..:~.den, 
but failed because of its strong defenses~ 
In ,1 507, the new Mamluk fleet sailed to Jeddah under the command 
of the new 'Governor of Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi. who upon arrival at Jed­
dah built strong fortifications and a strong protecting wall. The Harn­
luk's fleet sailed to India and defeated the Portuguese fleet in the Port . 
. 
of Chaul in 1508. But the, Mamluks were badly beaten by the Portuguese in 
the battle of Diu in 1509. 
Al-Ghouri decided to build anpther fleet, but the Venetians re­
fused to supply him ""'ith wood because ,"they were thinking of establish­
ine; a ne't-T land trade route through Persia and Turke'y."69 So he turned 
toward the Ottomans "who supplied him with the needed wood as nell as 
68' .Ibic!., p. 258. 

69Anis , '2l2..~ cit •• p. 121. 
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300 capnons. 1f7 
In 1509, the Ethiopian Enpress sent Ita messenger to India to sug­
'gest to the Portuguese King's viceroy there an alliance against the 
Mu~liins. n71 ,The Ethiopians. needed a strong ally to help them against 
the Muslim states in Abyssinia Who were aided by the Ma:mluks as 'Well as 
by the Ashrafs of Mecoa. The Ethiopian messenger gave the Portuguese 
information about the eastem coast of the Red Sea and retumed hane with 
a ~ortuguese diplanat10 delegation. 
In 1509, Albuquerque became the Govemor of Portuguese territories 
in Ir;dia and decided to take advantage of the new information obtained 
to penetrate the Red Sea since the Mamluks had no fleet to defend it 
then. To get the Portuguese King's approval of such an expedition he 
II. 
pointed out that: 1) the Muslim Xndianswere depending ,on the Mamluks to 
help them expel the Portuguese; 2) the Muslim Shah of Bijabour in India 
helped the ~1amluks after their defeat in the battle of Diu, and 3) the 
importanc e of occupying Aden to close the entrance of the Red Sea 
against Muslim ships. 
In 1513. Albuquerque attacked Aden but fa·iled to take it, so he 
penetrated the Red Sea in an attempt to reach Jeddah, but he could not 
. 
because of the winds. Instead he occupied the Island of Kamaran and at­
tacked Adenaggln without success, so he sailed back to India. 
, , 
I:q 151'5. the new Mam.luk fleet sailed fran Suez under the' Turkish 
commander Salman Al-Rais. With orders to attack the Portuguese posses­
sions in India. In Jeddah, the Govemor AI-Kurdi took over the duties 
7O:rbid. " p. 121. 
71Mustaf'a Sal1m. AI-Fath Al-'Uthmani Al-Awal' LU-Yaman (cairo, 

Egypt: 1969~. p. 68. 
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of the 	commander of the expedition, and decided to use the fleet to 
establish defenses by occupying important islands in the Had Sea and 
ports on the Yaneni coast. The fleet failed to take Aden, but succeeded 
in taking the Island of Kamaran , and fortified it. 
In 1517, the new Portuguese Governor, Lopo Soares, led a naval 
expedition which attacked Aden and forced its ruler to subnit, but in­
stead of laridll1g m Aden, he sailed into the Bed Sea and made the first 
serious Portuguese attanpt to attack Jeddah. Soares I adventure was 
described in an interestmg way in the chronology of Al-Haddrami, from 
which I quote because it gives an idea about the style of Muslim his­
torians: 
Year 923 H (AD 1517): In "this year the Franks, God curse 
them, came from India to the port of Aden with thirty sail­
.ing vessels, consisting of grabs and galliots, making demon­
strations of aid to the people of Aden against the Egyptians, 
. and they destroyed nothing in, the harbou-r.. A party of than 
c:mn.e ashore, then the Einir Mardjan met them on the coast and 
sent a splendid banquet to them at their ships. ·They demand­
ed ship-captains (Rubbartin) to go ,dth them to Jeddah, and 
the :Emir Mardjan gave them a number of ship-captains, Syrians 
against the will of the (said) captains. AlIthia is' (indeed) 
enough (to show) the wickedness of the Franks. They then 
went on to Jeddah and mooredm its harbour, but the Einir 
Salman was there at the head of an army of Turks and others. 
They had learned of· his (the Frank's) coming to Jeddah and 
were . ready to engage them. However, not one of the Franks 
landed on the coast at Jeddah; on the contrary, the Emir . 
Salman sought them . ou t in a grabe or two. When he got within. 
range of them, he fired at than with his guns, destroymg two. 
or three out of their ships. Then the gunner (Madafi'i) 
put. something m the powder (barut) so that the.gun went out 
of the actions, and the fire burned part of the grabe where 
Salman was; it is said that the gunner was' a Christian serv­
'. ing with Salman, but Salman executed the gunner and returned 
,to Jeddah safe and sound" The Franks removed (tarafa t) from 
the port of Jeddah, returning in the direction ot the Yemen. 
Then Salman or one 01" his men followed them in a grabe to the 
.. 	
vic inity of Luhaiyah (Ioheia). Then they ~ved front the' 
Franks a grabe containing a numver of Franks wan. they brought 
back to Jeddah; then they set out w~th them to the Sultan, 
the Lord of the Rum. Sane of the Franks went to the port of 
55 
.t\don, and the Emir Hcllujan p:ave them vIator that they ro­

C1id.1T~d, nnd r:1nsoll1(.:cl somo. of the prisoners from them. 

Thon they returned, unsuccessful,' to Hunnuz, may God 

abandon them. 72 . . 

In 1517 t the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks, and as a result, 
they became involved in the struggle in the Red Sea. However, they 
were not active at the beg:inning because: 1) they were busy' on other 
frontiers; 2) their nominal control of the Yemeni coast, which was 
important in, fonning a defense against the Portuguese, and 3) their 
main fleet was located in the Mediterranean Sea. 
In 1519, at the, request of Sharif Barakat II, tIthe Governor of 
Egypt sent a small fieet n73 which was stationed in Jeddah, while prep­
arations started in Suez to build a ,neet. During the 1517-1520 per­
iod, the Portuguese paid more'attention to extending their control 
in the Persian Gulf area, but they continued to send expeditions 
into t~e Red Sea to delay ottoman' naval preparations to gain supremacy 
in th~ Red Sea.' In 1520, a fleet led by De Sequeira entered the 
Red Sea to· land a diplomatic mission on the Ethiopian coast. After 
land1ng the mission, he sailed to attaok Jeddah, but the winds and the 
military readiness in Jeddahforced him to change his mind and return 
to India. 
In 1523, another expedition was sent to bring back the Portuguese 
mission in Ethiopia, and on its way back it stopped at Aden where the 
local mir, who was reluctant to submit to Ottoman rule, "told Eiter 
da Silveira that he would pay tribute if helped against the Turks; a 
72Translated by Robert Serjeant, The' Portugp.ese of the S. Arabian 
Coast (London, Great Britain I 1963), pp. SO-51. . 
73 .Anis, OPe cit., p. 120. 
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ship was left the~ to exact toll in th'e straits, but the .Sheikh impris­
oned 'the crew • n74 
In 1526-1527, . the Ottomans sent a fleet to occupy Yemen, but 
upon arrivmg in Yemen, a struggle for power took place between the 
leaders. 'This struggle caused a delay in the achievement. of this 
goal•. When the cooperation between, the. Portuguese and the Ethio;pians 
threatened "\::he Red Sea, the Turkish Commander. Mustafa Birim sailed to . 
the Island o'f Kamaran, fort.i:t'ied it, .and sailed on to Aden in 1529.· 
He besieged Aden, but was defeated by the combined Adani-Portuguese 
forCes. He left Aden,andsucceeded in reaching India, where he 
helped the local Shah to defend Diu,' when the Portuguese forces ·attacked 
.it, :ill 1531 • 
'.. 
. . In 153.8, a'large Ottoman neet, und~r the command ,of Sulaiman 
Pasha Al~Khadhl, sailed from Suez on its way.to India. The Commander 
fortified the Yaneni coasts and the Island of Kamaran•. Then he sailed 
. . 
to Aden, which he took by force. He hanged its :Emir and burned the 

toWn,' . The Ottoman fleet left Aden and went to Diu,.. which it failed to 

take after a long siege. The .f1eetretu~ed after' suffering a defeat 

a t the hands of the Portuguese. 

. 
In 1541, the last Portuguese expedition to the Red' Sea left Goa 
under the leade rship of Estevao da Gama. He landed troops' at Musawa r 
and saUed to attack Jeddah,where he succeeded.in landing some of his 
men at Abu Al-Dwa'ir,. south of Jeddah. But the then Shartf Abu-Noumi II 
. called for. a Jihad (Crusade) and led a large· amy which forced the Port- . 
uguese to depart. Atter his unsuccesstul.. attack on Jeddah, da Gama 
74' '.Admiralty,: Opt Cl.t" p. 260. 
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sailed as far as Tur, 011 the Gulf of ,Suez, but he did not meet the Ot,.t,o­
man neat and returned -to India. 
In 154?, the ,ottoman navigator Firi Rais led a neet whioh re­
, . 
captu;r:ed Adeli". where an Arab'Shaykh had rebelled and asked for 'Portu­
guese help.' In 1551, Piri Rai's 's~iled 'again from Suez to eAvel the 
, , 
'Port~guese from the Pe~sian 9'ulf, btithis 'expeditions suffered heavy· 
lQsse's, and he wa.s blamed f~r the losses and executed. The withdrawal 
of the,PortugUese from the Bed Sea helped the Ottomans to 3trengthen 
their positions there~' and when a religio'Us oivil' war broke out in 
Ethiopia, the ottomans 'seized the opportunity Cind took Musawa J and 
Sav.;rakin in 1557. The Ottomans signed a treaty with lI:Emperor Fasilidas 
of Ethiopia :who agreed toolose Ethiopian ports to :thePortuguese. u75 
If, 
Sinoe the 1550 J s, the Ottoman oontrol of the Red Sea was finnly 
establisheq" and Muslim ships oarrying pllgrjzns and goods were able to 
reach Jeddah and Suez, inspite of the presence of the Portuguese in the 
Indian Ocean. The Portuguese, concentrated their attention on the Per­
sian qulf area and India where they started' fac ing c'OJ!1!petition from 
other ~iestem European powers. With the disappearance of the Portu­
guese threat, the Ottomans, relaxed their'preparations and lost interest 
in the Indian:, Ocean. 
In the late sixteenth oenture, the British became active in the 
Eastern' t,rades against the Portuguese and Dutch. ,In 1608, a British 
fleet of the East India company, under ,the c'ommand of Will,iam Keeling, 
was ordered to reach Aden to establish .•:{£aotory there, but the., ,fleet 
gav:e up',at Soootra and ~id not reaoh Aden. ,Atter.:.;.making the Red Sea 
75Anis,Op. cit•• ' p. 131. 
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an Ottoman Lake, and pecause of pressure ,from European powers, British, 
French etc., the Ottomans agreed to ~et European ships sail into· the 
Red Sea only up to ~eddah, where :they were to unload their cargo, even 
if it· 't-ras for' Egypt. . The cargo bouna. for Egypt was to be carried on 
, ships owned and manned by Muslims. The Ottomans' "refused pe~ission 
.for European ships to land at Suez, and 'transfer its passengers over­
.'. 
land. 'to Alexandria jn 'Egypt. 1176 
. ,There is no. record of. hQW the Ottomans enforced these regulations, 
because the Ottoman fleet was not strong enough to stop a combined 
European 'fleet. ,Blt it· could be, assumed that the European interest, 
especially the, British, w~s not directed 'toward the Red Sea at that 
,time, which permitted the' Ottomans to set up ,these regulations. When 
II, 
the British bec~emore interested intha', Red Sea, they did not hesi­
tate: ,to attack Aderi and' occupy it in the ,early nineteenth century•. 
,J,' , 
., Y', 
76 . . 

Al-Mahasini and Shari~. op. cit., p., 196. , 

CHAPTER VII 
THE' CONCLU~Qi 
( I 
Loo}(ing back at the period that lasted for 112 years, and through 
vThich the Holy lands of Islam passed through experiences, some of which 
',:were -pleasmg ones, but most of which were unhappy ones. 'A1~Hijaz, all 
through history was the target of any new Islamic dynasty because of 
its' religious,'jmportance. Every dynasty was only interested in gaining 
the title Hami AJ.-Haramin (Protector or. the two Mo'sques), and having 
the names of the ruler mentioned in Al-Khutba. The holder of the title
.' ~ 
not ,o~ly gained the loyalty and respect of his Muslim subjects, but also 
the respect of the Muslims in are~s that were not under his control. 
The p,re.;;.Ottoman dynasties did not pay much attention to a 'strQng 
defense of the Arabian. Peninsula, and records shoVi' only small garriSOns 
stationed here' and 'there. If those dynasties whose kings orsultans 
were not Arabs, thought and managed to control the whole Pen1nsula and 
, established strong forts" ~he Muslim world would have be,en able to keep 
control, of the trade and to stop the Portuguese threat and other ' 
European 'threats which followed it later. 
Irithe case of the ottomans, their interest In the Middle East 
resulted from the successful Hungarian resistance which halte~ the 
Ottoman adv~nces in Eastern' and Central EUrope', besides the rising 
Safavid threats. in Persia. Helped by the weakness of the ~amlUks,. the 
, ottomans overran the Mamluk's Kingdom and q:u1okly acquired the title of 
60 
J 
the Protector of Islam, as a result of the subnission of the local 'ruler 
of l-iecca. 
The ottoman administration did: not help to improve conditions of 
, the, Holy lands. By lea'U':ing matters to the local rulers. ~heottomans' did 
not help to bring stability, beoause of the struggle 'for power among the 
members of the Ashrafs. The ottomans did not spend enough to j,mprove 
the internal oonditioos, and the amount they spent was used for reli­
gious reasons ,to lift the prestige of the Sultan, or to pay local lead.-· 
ers or tribes that the ottomans faUed completely tooontrol only tem­
porarily. ' 
When the ottomans interfered; they interfered to strengthen their 
position, not to improve conditions in the area. The period was 1\111 of 
~ , 
.ter'rible inoidents in which Turkish generals: and· s.oldiers acted in a 
. <iistasteful way that only showed disrespect for the Holy places and its· 
]local and superior rulers. The .irregularity and the disrespect showed 
the .weak ~gulations that controlled the ottanan armies at that time. 
I do not think that only the· Ottomans could be blamed for that' 
bad situation; the local rulers should share a part of the blame. As 
it was show in the chapter ·on the local rulers, they personally enjoyed 
the revenues oommg :f'roni the Ottoman Sultan, and 'from the custom dues of 
Jeddah. Every9ne was interested in keeping h~self1n power and, in in­
creasing l1is revenue by raiding nearby areas. The unwise traditional 
system that each Sharif was ·to have his own amy of slaves did not help 
to es~ablish o~er, instead it caused disorders and bloodshed.. We saw 
how the ambitions of Sharif Ahmad led to the fall of two Sharif's and the. 
losl:ng of innooent people IS' lives. 
During most of the period, t~e' OttOmans' opposed Sharif's expan­
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sion' into the area south of Al-Hijaz, but did not interfere against ex­
peditions into Nejd.. This policy served' the ottomans enabling than to 
control the 1mport~t and easily defended'. coastal area, while the dif-.· 
ficult tas~of controlling the desert was lett to the Ashrafs. At that 
same tiMe, the Ashrafs" actio~s coUld'be considered as attempts to 
establish a ~ynasty :in. the Arabian Peninsula, as well as to increase 
. their own income. 
A:3 for the· defense of the Holy lands against. foreign powers, the 
Ottomans stationed small troops j.n Jeddah, and 'if it were not for the 
strong fortifications of Jed~ah built earlier, the Portuguese would 
have suc~eeded in reaching the two Holy Cities. The Ottomans followed 
the same policy of not trying :0 control the whole Arabian Penin~a, 
alt~h.ough at that ,time, a greater danger, represented by the Portuguese, . 
existed•.. 
But r do: not think that anyone', or at leas't myself, can deny the 
, iMportant role the Ottomans played to protect the Holy lands when 'the 
danger arose. AlthoUgh they employed a; small power of theirs, they 
succeeded in ending the Portuguese threat, but· they did not try to show 
,enoug~ forqe to stop th~,European thre'ats in the S,outh Arabian Coast 
and "the Persian Gulf area. 
The Holy lands' continued to suffer from the same conditions of 
misuses of authorities by ,local rulers, . from tribal raids anclfrom bad 
behavior of Turkish offiCials, which' helped to~::keep it in an unstable 
condition'for a long period. 
With the caning of the present Kingdom of Saudi, Arabia, . the, ~oly 
lands. began to enjoy a stabUity that they did not enjoy since the early 
period of Islam. For th~ first t:1me, the 1llh~bitants began to enjoy 
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having a responsible government whose interest is not to raise ,its pres­
tige'in the eyes ot the Musl:1ms,' but also, to improve the over all oon­
ditions. The inore,ased and contmuous activities of. the Saudi govern­
ment helped to establish law and to :1mprove theeoonom~c, eduoational 
and .sooial aspects ot"lii'e: i~ the Hc;>ly land.s • 
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